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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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EXPULSED WEST BANK LEADERS DISCUSS THEIR MOVEMENT

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 16-22 Jun 80 pp 11-13

[Interview with Fahd al-Qawasimah, mayor of Hebron, Muhammad Milhim, mayor of Halhul and Rajab al-Tamimi, judge of Hebron by Nasri Hajja: "AL-DUSTUR Interviews the West Bank Leaders: There Are No Extremists or Moderates Among Us"]

/Text/ The recent developments which the occupied areas of Palestine, especially the West Bank, have witnessed, and the repressive measures the Israeli authorities are pursuing against the Palestinians clearly reveal the dead end which the "peace" talks over autonomy for the Palestinians have reached. These have been accompanied by bloody terrorist operations against the local leaders of the people of the West Bank. The bombing operation last week occurred as a culmination of policy Begin's government has been following to get rid of the leaders, which it began with expulsion, banishment and enforced exile. As Israel was carrying out the bombing operations in the West Bank, Fahd al-Qawasimah, mayor of Hebron, Muhammad Milhim, the mayor of Halhul, and Judge Rajab al-Tamimi, the judge of Hebron, whom the Israeli authorities had recently expelled in answer to the uprisings in the West Bank and the Hebron operation against the Zionist settlers, came to London.

This visit came by invitation of the Council to Augment Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) which is run by a council composed of three members, Michael Adams, David Watkins, a member of parliament for the Labor Party, and Dennis Walters, also a representative and member of the governing Conservative Party.

The three exiled persons spoke Monday morning at a press conference attended by representatives of all British and Arab newspapers in London. The British television service also held a meeting with Muhammad Milhim. On the evening of the same day, the three people talked in the British House of Commons, described the repressive measures to which the Palestinian people were exposed in the West Bank at their press conference and their session in the House of Commons, and asked British public opinion to take serious steps to declare their solidarity with the Palestinian people and their right to determine their destiny.

A number of party organizations and a number of Labor Party and Liberal Party branches proclaimed their solidarity with the cause of the banished persons, and 52 members of the British House of Commons belonging to the Labor Party declared their solidarity and their condemnation of the banishment of the three leaders in a signed letter to Menachem Begin, in which they demanded that the banished persons be returned to their land and country. AL-DUSTUR met with the Palestinian leaders a few hours before their trip to New York to raise the issue again before the Security Council. This is the text of the interview:

AL-DUSTUR: Let us begin with the present. Yesterday Israel tried to assassinate Bassam Shak'ah, Karim Khalaf and Ibrahim al-Tawil. A bomb exploded in a crowded street in Hebron. What are the goals of this action in the context of the current situation on the bank?

Fahd al-Qawasimah: The issue simply is that the occupation /forces/ want to get rid of the national leaders in the West Bank and for this the technique of banishment was used. In view of our current movement to explain our cause to the international, Western and Palestinian community in a manner which irked the occupation, it began to feel that the banishment act had caused it many problems, more than it imagined, and that this method had not realized its hopes. Therefore it started experimenting with another technique, which is to get rid of the national leaders by striking out at them physically and eliminating them by planting bombs in their cars or their places of residence, as happened in Hebron. There is no doubt that these operations prove that the Israelis want to get rid not of the national leaders but the entire Palestinian people in the occupied territories by sowing terror in Palestinian society so that it will achieve what it wants, which is to acquire the Palestinians' land without the Palestinian people.

AL-DUSTUR: The results of the latest FATH conference have shown a rigid position and a call to do away with the state of Israel, establishing a democratic state in all Palestine. Is there anything in this which conflicts with the nature of the Palestinian people's political struggle in the West Bank?

Fahd al-Qawasimah: In reality, there was no rigidity or non-rigidity. Rather, the latest FATH movement conference was a conference for clarifying a view. The Palestinian stage had been dominated by some slackness and many statements, and this conference, as I believe, dotted the I's in a manner leaving no room for concealment or obscurity. The Palestinian people are demanding their legitimate rights, as the resolutions of the international community have stipulated. The conference stressed its solicitude for national unity and determined that the resolutions adopted at the previous Palestinian National Congresses were part of the resolutions of the FATH conference. I do not consider that they expressed rigidity or non-rigidity. This does not mean that the previous position was non-rigid and now has become rigid but rather that there had been a lack of clarity

in vision among the detachments and the individuals of the Palestinian people, and the conference clarified the vision and stymied those who wanted to divide the Palestinian people into an extremist side and a moderate side. The conference stated that all the Palestinian people are behind the Liberation Organization and behind the resolutions which it adopted in national congresses in the course of its struggling history since the Palestine Liberation Organization was established. The resolutions of the previous national congresses demanded the establishment of a Palestinian state on any portion of Palestinian territory which is liberated, and the FATH organization still holds to this resolution. This is the position, and no change occurred as I see.

AL-DUSTUR: The Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in all places where they are located. To what extent, in practical reality, is the leadership role of the organization apparent on the bank, and to what extent do you possess freedom of movement as local leaders inside?

Fahd al-Qawasimah: We do not agree that we should be independent of the Liberation Organization even to the extent of half a percent. We work within the framework of the Liberation Organization, exercise judgment within the context of it, and move within the context of it. We want no independence from the organization--rather, the occupation is trying to create leaders in place of the organization, and we have rejected that because we believe that all the Palestinian people are integrated and one and represented by the Liberation Organization. This issue is not being raised in any manner within the bank and every citizen believes in this. However, when we state that the Liberation Organization is our representative, that does not mean that we close our mouths and do not speak our opinions--we have always stated our personal opinion whenever any issue was presented to us. We have always stated that we are ultimately committed to the resolutions of the Liberation Organization. We have said that in the occupied areas and are saying it; we are saying it everywhere, because we do not agree to have any leaders in its place, whatever the conditions might be--we believe that this is the occupation's demand and the demand of everyone who tries to split up the Palestinian people and create numerous alternative leaders.

AL-DUSTUR: Some political appraisals indicate that the Labor Party will take over the next government in "Israel." There is a prevailing tendency in the Labor Party which calls for a solution to the Palestinian problem through Jordan. What is your view, in the event such a solution does exist?

Fahd al-Qawasimah: I would like to stress the fact that there is no difference between the policy of the Likud and the policy of the Labor Party. Israeli society is not run by individuals but is run by one movement, the Zionist movement, and I do not see a difference between those who are in power. If there is some opposition, that lies in the framework of movement

tactics and the attempt to make the world believe that there are two different platforms. The practical reality proves this: it is the Labor Party which started the settlement policy, and the Likud followed this policy. The same is the case with the incorporation of Jerusalem, and the consideration that eastern Jerusalem is part of Israel: the Labor Party has refused to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people to determine their destiny and it has refused to consider the Liberation Organization a representative of this united people. I see no difference in the policies of the two sides. The Likud came in and set forth autonomy, knowing that that is rejected, and the Labor Party will come in and propose negotiations with Jordan, knowing that that is rejected, because the Palestinian people know what they want, which is their right to determine their own destiny and establish the independent Palestinian state. I believe that Jordan itself understands these tactics the most and these games no longer fool the Jordanian leaders, especially since Jordan's experience since the October war, in the days of the Labor Party government, proves this. I believe that all this is a sort of planting of erroneous fantasies by Israeli policy, and our people do not want to live in fantasies, like the fantasy of betting on the American elections, which some claim will bring the Palestinian people back to their territory and which also is a delusion and a fantasy. American policy has been opposed to our people for more than 30 years and it has not changed. Let it be clear that the road to Palestine will come only through Palestinian will and Arab will, and not through any other way.

AL-DUSTUR: What are the goals of your tour of the European countries and America, besides explaining the issue of your banishment? Will this tour be cast in the mold of the organization's recent diplomatic movement as a consequence?

Fahd al-Qawasimah: In reality, we are not isolated from the Liberation Organization; we are part of the organization and are performing a combative mission, each in his own position. We are functioning not as officials in the foreign ministry of a country but as revolutionaries, and in this movement of ours we are trying to explain the issue of our banishment to the international community and to underline our people's right to determine their destiny and establish a Palestinian state and underline the degree of viciousness of the Israeli repressive measures adopted against that people. After London we will return to New York, then go to Washington and tour the United States, then go back to Europe, then Beirut, and make an Arab tour. In all this, we will be striving to establish our rejection and our people's rejection of the autonomy plot and to establish our position, and that of our people, that the Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people everywhere.

If we fail to succeed in returning to our land, I will consider a place in southern Lebanon alongside my brothers in the Palestinian resistance.

AL-DUSTUR: Can you talk to us about the situation in the West Bank now?

Shaykh Rajab al-Tamimi (the judge of Hebron): The situation in the West Bank is very difficult. The Moslems are suffering from national repression, and religious oppression on the one hand, especially since the enemy is trying to suppress all attempts which will help cause the people to group together to protest against its policy and its settlement. It is imposing curfews on Fridays and thereby bringing about repression from the religious and political standpoints.

The situation regarding the Islamic shrines is sorrowful. The noble shrine of Abraham, the great mosque in the town of Hebron which was built in the time of the Islamic conquest in the days of the Caliph Sulayman ibn 'Abd-al-Malik toward the end of the first century after the Hegira, has been sacred to Moslems since then, but, when the Zionist forces occupied the town of Hebron, they raised the Israeli flag over the mosque for 2 weeks. They then removed the carpets and entered the mosque with their shoes on and proceeded to perform their rituals inside the mosque. We objected, protested and made condemnations but the authorities continued their offenses and turned a large part of the Islamic mosque into a synagogue. The Zionists are still trespassing against our shrines. In 1976 settlers came into the mosque, tore up the holy Koran and broke up the storerooms and wall clocks. The occupation authorities imposed a curfew in Hebron for 16 days after that incident. Also, there have been transgressions against the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque. The occupation authorities have taken over the Moroccan Gate, which is in the hands of the army, and a group from the Gush-Emonim, under supervision of the authorities, tried to enter to pray in the mosque a few months ago, but Moslems came to the mosque from everywhere and prepared to defend it. The camp David agreements had a great effect on the vicious attack which the occupation forces are unleashing against the masses. They have begun accelerating the establishment of settlements in an unprecedented manner, expelling landowners and taking over the land. Popular uprisings have taken place to remain on the land.

AL-DUSTUR: In response to journalists' questions at your press conference yesterday, our brothers Milhim and al-Qawasinah mentioned that there are progressive Israeli groups which are joining forces with the struggles of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. What is your opinion about these groups, Shaykh?

Shaykh Rajab al-Tamimi: I do not actually know any of these groups and have not seen any of them. I know that the goal of every Israeli is the same, even if they differ as to methods. However, if there is a Jew who really is against Zionism and wants to coexist with the Palestinian people within a Palestinian state, that is great, and they must bring their rejection of Zionism to the stage of real struggle against it. Since the most ancient times, the Jews have been living with Moslems and living in total freedom. In no place in the world were they more fortunate than when they were among Moslems. If these Jews want to live with the

Palestinians, we will welcome them, on condition that that not be under the dominance of Zionism, because Zionism is against the presence of the Palestinian people on their territory and in their nation. We are not opposed to Judaism as Judaism. Rather, we are opposed to Zionism as a racist colonialist movement.

AL-DUSTUR: What is your view about the methods Israel has resorted to to eliminate the internal leadership?

Muhammad Milhim (mayor of Halhul): The fact is that the Palestinian people on the bank have not been without leaders for 1 day. Even if they assassinate and banish all the local leaders, the people can always choose firm leaders. The issue as I see it is not one of leaders but one of liquidation of the people, and proof of that is the fact that when bombs exploded in the mayors' cars, bombs exploded in the most crowded streets of Hebron and seven citizens were injured. The truth is that this is an attempt to liquidate the people. It began in 1967, but, following Camp David, the deterioration of the talks, and the fact that they reached a dead end, it has started to escalate. However, Israeli policy ultimately wants a land without a people. Let us suppose that all the mayors are banished or liquidated--there will be elections, and stronger and firmer leaders will come in.

AL-DUSTUR: What is your opinion on the expectations which hold that when the Labor Party comes to power in Israel the Palestinian problem will find a solution through Israeli-Jordanian talks?

Muhammad Milhim: I, as a Palestinian, would not bet on the Israeli horse, the American horse or the European horse. I would just bet on the Palestinian horse and the Arab horse. As to whoever takes over the cabinet in Israel, that will all be within the framework of the Zionist movement, which calls for the takeover of Palestine and the banishment of our people one way or another. Some people want this openly, others want it deviously. Let us stop talking about who will take over the cabinet in Israel--they are all Zionists and have the same schemes. Thus, we must just bet on the Palestinian will and the Arab will. As for relations with Jordan, we are not against Jordan, Syria or any Arab country. These peoples and countries are our heartland. Therefore we are demanding the right to determine our destiny, then we will choose relations with a given regime or government. We are the ones who will decide, and we will not agree to have any preconditions set on the nature of the Palestinian situation following withdrawal and independence. Our relations with Jordan and the Arab nation are organic ones. As for relations with regimes, the Palestinian government which we hope will come into being will determine those at the proper time.

We, on this European tour of ours, are trying to return to our land and are insisting on that because if we waver over on our right to return, the

Israeli authorities will proceed to banish more of our brothers. We are also trying to acquaint the international community with the truth of matters on the bank and to call upon it to stand alongside us in returning and alongside our people in their struggle. The Palestine Liberation Organization in our representative, in HaHul or in New York. Consequently, when we talk, we talk with the same aspirations and hopes, and when we move we move along the line of the Liberation Organization and the Palestinian masses which the organization represents.

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CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD MEMBER CITES JORDAN IN REMARKS

JN052128 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1935 GMT 5 Aug 80

[Syrian Television interview with Mustafa Khaluq Hajjah, officer in charge of the Muslim Brotherhood's armed units; date not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Question] Would you first introduce yourself and tell us briefly about your life history?

[Answer] The name is Mustafa Khaluq Hajjah, born in Aleppo in 1947. I graduated as a civil engineer and worked for the state organization for the exploitation of the Euphrates River basin in al-Raqqah. I am married with two children.

[Question] When did you join the Muslim Brotherhood Organization?

[Answer] I joined the organization in 1962 while a student at the al-Jawafi secondary school in Aleppo. I was introduced to the organization by fellow students.

I remained in the organization until 1964, when I left for Egypt for my university education. I graduated as a civil engineer in 1970, when I returned to Syria and worked in the Euphrates basic project in al-Raqqah. In 1974, I was called up for national service, which I completed in 1976. In 1977, I returned to the Muslim Brotherhood Organization as a group member. Later, I was promoted to group leader. Then I and another person were put in charge of armed units consisting of reservists [ihtiyatiyin] and demobilized elements [musarrahin].

In my position, I was in direct contact with the command of the Muslim Brotherhood's military branch in Aleppo, which was composed of 'Adnan 'Uqlah, Mustafa Qassar, Ayman al-Khatib, Nabih 'Allush and others.

[Question] Would you tell us about your task as a member of the organization?

[Answer] My main task was to look after organizational affairs. Like all other members, I also had the task of encouraging others to join or support the organization's military branch.

In 1979, I went to Jordan to obtain instructions from certain officials [not further identified] concerning the persons under my charge. In the same year, the command asked me to send someone to Jordan to obtain funds and a number of identity cards. I sent this person to Jordan and he brought back 400,000 Syrian pounds and some identity cards. I believe there were eight cards. I handed the money and the cards to 'Adnan 'Uqlah.

[Question] Was he the commander of the military organization?

[Answer] Yes, he was the officer in charge of the military organization in Aleppo.

[Question] Yes, go on.

[Answer] In the same year, or possibly early in 1980, the Jordanian leadership [not further identified] sent 200,000 Syrian pounds through someone called 'Abdallah Mishshu. He gave me the sum and I conveyed it to 'Adnan 'Uqlah.

[Question] Have you read Law No 49?

[Answer] I have read this law. I believe it shows a desire to seriously stop the bloodshed in this country. This law is an opportunity for those who want to dissociate themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood Organization to do so. Those who do not seize this opportunity will only have to blame themselves in the future.

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BELKHOJA ON TUNISIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 23 Jul 80 p 3

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Belkhoja conducted by Aïya Bouhadibat "Tunisian-Libyan Relations Have Reached Dead Center"]

[Text] Even though considered one of the most verbose of our ministers, ever since he has been with foreign affairs, Hassan Belkhoja has been relatively silent.

Finally, he was willing to answer questions of interest to us.

[Question] Mr Minister, could you explain to us Tunisia's position in Freetown as to the problem of Western Sahara--a problem which, it is said, might have split the OAU?

[Answer] Tunisia has maintained a steady position on the problem of Western Sahara, determined by the major concern of avoiding a confrontation among the countries in the area. We have tried to maintain an attitude of neutrality which does not mean an attitude of indifference. Quite to the contrary: This neutrality would enable us, we hope, to intervene at the proper time to bring about a rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, deeply and even dangerously split on this matter.

This was the view I expressed in Freetown, appealing to the reason and self-control of all concerned parties in the name of the Supreme Fighter.

[Question] What will be Tunisia's contribution to the first Arab economic summit planned for Amman next November, and on what level will Tunisia participate?

[Answer] We are awaiting with interest the first Arab economic summit meeting in Amman and we intend to submit proposals for inter-Arab economic cooperation based on the complementary nature of the economies of the different Arab countries, on the one hand, and the emphasis of the primary role which the Arab world could play on the economic level among Third World countries and, particularly, the fraternal African

countries, on the other. It is already obvious that a good part of the summit will deal with political problems which, considering the current state of things, have retained their priority. We hope that President Bourguiba will be represented at the summit by Mohamed Mzali.

[Question] How do you assess the possibilities for a Middle Eastern solution, specifically following the Camp David failure and Europe's timid entry in the scene?

[Answer] It would be difficult to be optimistic as to reaching an overall solution of the Middle Eastern problem, particularly after the Camp David failure which proved that it takes far more than words and documents to bring Israel to see reason. Europe's entry in the scene could, conversely, introduce a new element of a kind to improve the chances for peace and introduce an element of balance.

In effect, by virtue of their geographic location and historical vision, the European and Western countries are better able to understand the problem of the Middle East and the aspirations of the peoples of the area with which they are linked through reciprocal interests and a common destiny.

[Question] Mr Minister, what is the state of present Tunisian-Libyan relations?

[Answer] Unfortunately, Tunisian-Libyan relations are at a dead center. Following the Gafsa events and the resulting shock, it is important for our Libyan brothers to make some concrete gestures which could reassure us as to the future of our relations. For example, they should answer positively the demand of the prime minister concerning the Continental Shelf, the closing down of training camps, and stop referring to a utopian merger and promote, instead, unity of action in all areas. This is what we want and which would enable us to build the joint future to which we aspire.

[Question] At a time when some African countries such as Senegal are closing down their missions for economy purposes, we are increasing ours. Is this necessary?

[Answer] I believe that the case of Senegal you mention is quite special and I believe that even after closing down a number of its missions, that country would still have more representation abroad than we do. Having said this, the development of Tunisian diplomacy requires a greater representation of our country in the Third World.

Our missions were concentrated in Europe, North America, and the Arab world and we have been very scantily represented in the Third World to which we belong and with which we must build a new economic order based

on our solidarity in all areas, and, particularly, the complementary nature of our economies.

The north-south dialogue and the triologue supported by the French presumes a community of views, positions, and actions on the part of Third World countries. Yet, even after opening four or five new embassies, we will remain unrepresented in East Africa and totally unrepresented in Latin America. Finally, we will be underrepresented in Asia. This means that we are quite behind in this area if we are to insure for our country its proper representation in the Third World.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

UGTT-UGTM COOPERATION REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Jul 80 p 4

[Report: "Intensification of Tunisian-Moroccan Trade Union Cooperation"]

[Text] A joint meeting was held yesterday at the seat of the UGTT [General Tunisian Labor Union], in Tunis, between a delegation of the General Union of Moroccan Workers, headed by its secretary general, Abderrazak Alliat, currently visiting Tunisia, and a delegation of the General Tunisian Labor Union, headed by Tijani Abid, the trade union's secretary general.

The meeting ratified the series of working sessions held by the two parties on 14 and 15 July.

The joint communique issued at the end of the meeting stipulated the following:

- Intensification of consultations, contacts, and exchange of knowledge, experience and information in all areas of trade union activities;
- Organization of practical training and meetings by the workers of the two countries;
- Organization of visits by officials of the different trade union branches with a view to studying in person the various aspects of trade union activities in each of the two countries;
- Encouraging exchanges of visits between trade unions of the same sector or line of activity;
- Encouraging reciprocal visits by delegations of young workers;
- Sending the children of members of the two trade union organizations to vacation camps in Tunisia and Morocco;
- Maintaining, on the African and international level, periodical and regular consultations on various points of interest to both parties.

Finally, as a sign of loyalty to the principles for which the now deceased Farhat Hached fought, whose martyrdom triggered the struggle for Moroccan liberation, it was decided to organize meetings in both countries with the participation of Moroccan trade union members in Tunisia and Tunisian trade union members in Morocco.

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CSO: 4400

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF ARAB LEAGUE CHARTER OUTLINED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 14 Jun 80 p 11

[Report by Michael al-Nimri on proposed amendment of Arab League charter]

[Text] The committees for amendment of the Arab League charter recently began a series of meetings in Abu Dhabi to discuss the proposed amendments in order to approve and present them in final draft at the next Arab summit meeting. AL-SAFIR acquired the text of these amendments. Following is a comparative analysis of the current Arab League charter and the new features of the amendments.

Since its establishment on 22 March 1945, the Arab League has been exposed to various forms of criticism, including that of its member nations.

This criticism resulted mostly from lack of understanding of the definitive role of the League by political and public forces. Criticism by member nations was, in most cases, an expression of their wish to push the League in a direction closer and more suitable to their position and requirements. The basic criticism, however, was that of the League's charter which is no longer compatible with the League's progress on the one hand, and the overall Arab situation on the other.

For the abovementioned reasons, several attempts were made to amend and update the League's charter. These attempts were made sporadically, and died down quickly.

The first attempt to amend the charter was made by the Syrian government in January 1951, when the leader of the Syrian delegation, Dr Nazim al-Qudsi, approached the League's council with a federal body called "the United Arab Nations." But the government of al-Qudsi fell, and so did the first attempt to amend the charter.

On 21 January 1954, the leader of the Iraqi delegation, Dr Fadil al-Jamali, proposed, in a memo, the approval of the concept of the "United Arab Nations" and the preparation of a constitution aimed at reaching that goal. This proposal, however, did not survive among the other Arab nations, due to the Baghdad Pact proposal and the Iraqi government's readiness to join it.

The third attempt to amend the charter was made in March 1956 by the former secretary general of the League, 'Abd al-Khaliq Hussunah. This attempt was aimed at amending organizational aspects of the charter. However, the tripartite aggression on Egypt stood in the way of this amendment.

In September 1959, Morocco suggested a reevaluation of the legal and political ties among the Arab nations. Discussion of such a suggestion was frozen due to disagreements among the Arab nations.

In February 1961, the general secretary brought up the subject of the Moroccan amendment, in addition to two other proposals one by Iraq and the other by Tunisia. A committee was formed to review these proposals. This attempt, however, ended like the previous ones as a result of tense Arab relations after Syria's separation from Egypt.

The 6th attempt was initiated in 1966 by the 3rd Arab summit. A committee was formed to study and report their findings to the 4th Arab summit to be held in Algeria in September 1966. However, this summit did not take place, and the June 1967 catastrophe occurred resulting in the failure of this attempt.

During the 7th Arab summit conference in al-Rabat on 29 October 1974, the conference approved a decision to amend the charter. A committee was formed to follow up, research and study for that purpose. However, this committee's report found its way to the League's files as well.

The 8th and last attempt which we are currently faced with, followed the Baghdad summit's decision to transfer the Arab League's headquarters to Tunisia, which took place in April 1979. The League's authorities felt they could take advantage of this occasion "to reorganize this national Arab organization." Based on this, the League's council issued its Resolution No 3843 on 28 September 1979 pertinent to development of the League's activities and the amendment of its charter and bylaws.

In order to carry out the above, the general secretary of the League formed a number of committees to discuss the development of the League's activities and charter. The committees have completed the charter's amendment proposals and are expected to submit them to the Arab summit conference to be held in Jordan at the end of this year.

The charter amendment could be described as a new charter even though the committees were intent on calling it an amendment "based on the desire to preserve the continuity factor in the League," due to its "constitutional and psychological" importance.

The new charter, or more accurately the amendment, which we are about to compare with the existing charter, consists of 8 chapters and 52 articles divided as follows:

Chapter 1:	Objectives and Principles
Chapter 2:	Membership
Chapter 3:	The League's Organization
Chapter 4:	Settlement of Arab Disputes
Chapter 5:	Joint Defense Measures
Chapter 6:	Relationship Between the League and Related Specialized Agency
Chapter 7:	Securities and Privileges
Chapter 8:	Miscellaneous Provisions

The charter's amendment involves two aspects: political and organizational.

Political Amendments

On a political basis, we notice that, due to the nature of social and political differences among Arab nations, the new charter takes into consideration developments in the Arab region without departing from the common denominator among the various Arab governments.

The [existing] charter's introduction emphasizes "faith in the unity of Arab destiny, and in the values and heritage of the Arab nation." We notice that the introduction of the proposed charter ignores open reference to Arab unity because it wants to make the unity requirement "a mere outcome of a logical cause." "The unity of Arab destiny makes the Arab nation and its wealth an incentive to protect such resources against any aggressions." It also makes unity of destiny "a starting point to wise distribution of this wealth for the benefit of the Arab citizen."

Since unity is "a result of a cause," it is emphasized in the chapter on Objectives.

While the subject of Arab unity is ignored in the objectives and principles of the existing charter, we notice that it is one of the first objectives pointed out in the proposed amendment.

The existing charter summarizes the League's objectives as being "insuring Arab cooperation in political matters; protection of member nations' independence; protection of Arab peace and security by peaceful settlement of Arab disputes; cooperation in economic, social and cultural matters, and looking after the interests of the Arab nation." The proposed charter aims at avoiding omissions. It defines the League's objectives as follows:

Arab Unity

1. Realization of Arab unity through the following:

--Strengthening ties among Arab nations and the realization of their unification in all fields for the common interest.

--Guaranteeing the Arab nation's national security, considering any attack against one of the Arab nations an attack against all.

--Consolidation of the Arab nations' sovereignty over their wealth, investment of their natural and financial resources and guidance of their human resources within an integrated Arab plan to achieve overall Arab development.

--Introduction of Arab civilization values and the revival and protection of the Arab cultural heritage.

--Reinforcement of joint Arab action to realize coordination and integration among Arab organizations, councils and committees.

2. Guaranteeing the rights of the individual in the Arab nation, and his physical and mental safety to enable him to exercise his basic rights through the establishment of an Arab society based on democracy, equality and social justice.

3. Work for the liberation of Palestine and for a joint struggle against Zionism, imperialism, and all kinds of racism.

4. Support for international peace and security and work for the establishment of new international laws based on freedom, justice and equality in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and nonalignment.

5. Strengthening cooperation with regional and international organizations.

6. Environmental protection of the Arab land.

The existing charter's regulations that member nations have to follow in order to achieve their objectives are based on traditional principles that are no longer suited for modernization and development of the region. These regulations consist of "equality in sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs of the member nations, prevention of the use of force to resolve Arab disputes, and mutual cooperation." The proposed amendment defines the principles as follows:

1. Consideration of the human element in all Arab political, economic or social actions.

2. Equality among member nations of the league.

3. Noninterference in internal affairs of member nations.

4. Abstention from the use of force and what threatens the territorial safety and political independence of any member nation, or departs in any way from the objectives of the League and the United Nations.

5. Peaceful settlement of disputes among member nations, and resolution of these disputes through the Arab League before seeking help from other international organizations.
6. Noninfringement of the right of member nations to take individual unification steps and consideration of these steps as part of the process of realizing overall Arab unity.
7. Respect and implementation of the League's decisions and abstention from helping any country against which the League has taken forceful measures.
8. Taking no positions or any policies that are in conflict with the League's objectives and principles or that are harmful to the common Arab welfare.

In comparing the principles and objectives of the existing charter with the proposed amendment, we notice that the latter tries to comply with modernization and developmental requirements. It also emphasizes national matters that are the basis of any Arab national action, such as the national Palestinian problem and fighting Zionism, imperialism and racism.

We also notice that some of the principles were intentionally introduced after the Egyptian government singly negotiated with the Zionist enemy and signed the treacherous Camp David agreement on 26 March 1979.

Politically, the amendment offers the League legal superiority over any Arab or international agreement signed by any of its members.

The proposal tries to reconcile two views in relation to popular representation in the League. One view advocates the necessity of this representation and the other finds this idea unrealistic at this stage. The proposal considers this representation existent in one form or another through the text that specifies the establishment of a council within the League that represents Arab organizations, unions and nongovernmental organizations. Definition of this council's bylaws was left to the council of development and economic and social integration. The latter will define details of the relationship of the organizations council with the League, and the methods in which the League can help realize the council's objectives.

Human Rights and Freedoms

Although the new charter is politically and organizationally a step ahead of the previous one, its drafters drew a line where the Arab person's rights and his general freedom were concerned. This may be due to their desire to have this charter approved by certain Arab governments.

Several problems and matters related to Arab human rights, our understanding of Arab unity and our movement toward achieving these goals were ignored by the new proposed charter.

Examples of these are:

--The Arab citizen's right to move and work within all Arab nations without any restrictions.

--Emphasis on giving Arabs, and not foreigners as the case is now, priority to work in various Arab nations. This naturally requires the cancellation of visa requirements among various Arab nations.

--Stipulation that there be freedom of communication of opinion among Arab nations by allowing the circulation of all printed matter.

--Citizenship and passports became a disturbing factor after Arab governments increased their infringements on the constitutional right of citizens. This necessitates insuring that no government has the right to withdraw citizenship from any of its citizens and the formation of specialized committees in the League to control violations.

Although the political aspects of the proposed amendments to the charter are important, the organizational aspects are not any less important for the following reasons:

--the objectives and principles specified in the charter will be difficult to implement without designation of proper authorities legally responsible for this implementation.

--The League's organizational structure in the light of its existing charter is no longer suitable for the developments the Arab region has been witnessing since the early 1950's. In addition to the lack of unity and coordination of efforts among the League's systems, there is the element of duplication [of efforts] and competition which is wasteful of efforts and money.

--Authorities in the existing organization are confused and intermingled in a way that delays serious work efforts.

The committees assigned to write up a new charter for the Arab League seem to have expended great efforts toward [the improvement of] the organizational side of the charter. In comparing the existing charter with the proposed one, we observe the following:

Membership and Restrictions: Existing charter provisions open the way to all nations who sign the charter to join the League provided they apply for that. It is therefore up to the League's council to evaluate the applicants and check if they fulfill the requirements.

In the proposed amendment, any independent Arab nation has the right to join the League provided it adheres to all its charter's regulations and provided its official language is Arabic. A two-thirds majority vote is required for accepting a new member.

The proposal, contrary to the existing procedures, ignored to point out the right to withdraw. However, there is nothing to legally prevent withdrawal.

While the existing charter provides for the penalty of expulsion by the council's unanimous agreement, the new proposal cancels this penalty and replaces it with freezing membership.

The League's Organization: The existing organizational structure of the League is as follows:

1. The League's Council, which is the highest authority.
2. Permanent Committees, which have become 12, some stipulated by the charter and others formed by the Council.
3. A General Secretariat, which has administrative authorities only.
4. Based on the joint defense and economic cooperation pact of 1950, two new committees were formed. These are the joint defense council and the economic council, renamed in 1977 the socioeconomic council.

The proposed charter based its organizational structure on limiting the major committees to what is necessary, granting them constitutional authorities needed to perform their duties, and authorizing them to form or dissolve subcommittees as they deem necessary.

The proposed amendment's organizational structure has the following main bodies:

League's Supreme Council, which is the highest authority in the League's organizational structure. It consists of the Arab countries' chiefs of state or governments. It meets once a year at the Arab summit conference in a constitutionally-controlled manner, unlike the existing situation.

This council has broad, unlimited authorities. It can assign duties to any committee of the League as it deems necessary. Two equally responsible councils are next in line to this supreme council. These hold regular sessions twice a year at the ministerial level. One of these councils will be for political and defense affairs and the other for nonpolitical matters. It is called the council of development and socioeconomic cooperation.

The Council of Political and Defense Affairs: Meets at the foreign ministers' level. It specializes in fulfilling the League's objectives in political and security matters. It is authorized to define the special strategy on the joint Arab work, take into disputes among member nations, take necessary action against violating nations, and coordinate between the members and other nations, and drawing up the informational policy in fundamental nationalistic matters, etc.

The jurisdiction of this council increases when the ministers of defense join it. It then becomes responsible for national security matters, the provision of defense systems and Arab security forces, Arab military industrialization and the formation of a military policy of cooperation and integration between the member nations.

The Council of Development and Socioeconomic Cooperation: Specializes in all matters that are neither political nor defense-related: Developmental, economic, social, educational, health, agricultural, etc. When necessary, it has the right to preside over conferences or more specialized councils of ministers.

The Arab Court of Justice: Is the fourth body in the League. It is a judicial body. Its jurisdiction is binding on members who approve it. Its decisions are binding. It has advisory and consultative jurisdictions. Any other specialized major Arab League committee or agency can ask for the Court of Justice's advice on any legal matter provided that matter is not already in litigation before the court.

The Secretariat General: The structure and jurisdictions of the secretariat are different in the proposed charter, especially the political authorities granted to the secretary general (similar to those granted to the secretary general of the United Nations), which the existing charter does not grant.

The secretary general is given the right to call sessions of the major councils, within certain limits, draw attention to Arab conflicts and problems and attempt to solve them, attend meetings of the League's committees and specialized Arab organizations, and include in the League's annual report his comments and suggestions on Arab and international matters and his views on joint Arab action.

Voting

One of the main problems the Arab League has suffered is the requirement of a unanimous agreement to issue important resolutions to make decisions binding on all member nations. If these decisions do not get unanimous agreement, they are binding only on those who approved them, with the exception of special cases. The proposed charter suggests passing the council's resolutions by a two-thirds majority vote. That is, if a session is attended by the majority of the League members (that is 50 percent

plus 1 member), there must be unanimous agreement of those present in order to issue a binding resolution. When there are more attendees, however, the two-thirds majority vote of those present will be enough, and the resolutions are binding on all.

The proposed charter excepted from the above requirements what it considers to be procedural matters where a majority vote of any number of attendees is enough. Note that quorum in all meetings is a majority of 50 percent plus 1. These voting provisions are applicable under the proposed charter to all matters without exception.

Settlement of Arab Disputes

The proposed charter observes that the existing charter is unable to deal with Arab disputes that occur from time to time. The proposal tries to resolve such disputes based on the principle of the necessity of peaceful settlement of Arab disputes within the Arab League before taking them elsewhere. The proposal lays down enough rules to make this principle effective.

Collective Arab Security

The joint defense pact of 1950 tried to avoid the Arab League's inadequacies in matters of joint Arab defense and collective security. However, the League's role in this area is still inadequate. The proposed charter takes into consideration a list of actions that guarantee this security. These include the provision that upon the suggestion of the council of political and defense affairs, and upon decision by the supreme council, the member nations should place at the service of the League the necessary armed forces, assistance and facilities to implement defense plans to face the dangers threatening the security and safety of the member nations, or to settle a conflict between two or more member nations.

As previously mentioned, these forces may be used for collective security purposes or in case of an armed attack against any member nation by any other nation. This will be upon request of the attacked nation, or upon the general secretary's request to hold a meeting of the council of political and defense affairs to study the situation and take the necessary measures, including the military measure. The proposal provides that the responsibility of command of these forces be given to organizations formed by the council of political and defense affairs.

Arab security forces may also be used to stop an armed conflict and separate the forces of two fighting League member nations after all other methods to resolve the fight fail. In this case, the armed forces will be under the direct command of the secretary general.

In summary, we can say that this proposal is one step ahead of the existing charter toward politically and organizationally improving the League's operation and its internal conditions.

This progress is within the limits allowed by formal Arab relations and the balance of power among Arab nations. We are left with the question of whether this proposed amendment will take place after all previous attempts failed. This is what we will find out in the coming Arab summit conference which will be held in the Jordanian capital, Amman.

9455

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

OAPEC URGES INCREASED REFINING RETURNS--Kuwait, 1 August (KUNA)--The Organization of Arab Oil Exporting Countries (OAPEC) called Friday for cooperation and coordination between producers to increase returns from oil refining and expanded investment in petrochemical industries. Unless such cooperation was maintained, no single producing country will be able to undertake the promotion of industries or develop its transport system, OAPEC's monthly bulletin to be released later today said. The OAPEC call follows a recent declaration by the industrial countries on lessening dependence on imported crude. The daily demand by those countries for OAPEC oil is expected to fall from 25 million to 17 million barrels during the remaining years of this century. OAPEC countries can improve the economics of transport by developing the oil tankers business and reducing capital costs of their operations, it said. [Text] [LD011140 Kuwait KUNA in English 1037 GMT 1 Aug 80]

PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MEETING--The Kuwaiti paper AL-QABAS says today that the Palestinian resistance will strike at the interest of any state that moves its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It cites a Palestinian source as saying that the leadership of the resistance movement has taken the decision "among a number of measures [it] will implement against the states which ignore the rights of the Palestinian people and Arab rights in Jerusalem." He said that an emergency meeting of all factions of the resistance movement will shortly be held in Damascus "to approve a series of recommendations taken by the military leadership of the resistance and which will be implemented specifically in this period and to coordinate steps in the political and military spheres with the Arab countries, in particular the steadfastness and confrontation front," which includes Syria, Algeria, Libya and South Yemen in addition to the organization. [Text] [LD020924 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0727 GMT 2 Aug 80]

SAUDI-TUNISIAN ACCORD--At noon yesterday Hassan Belkhoja, the minister of foreign affairs, returned to Tunis at the end of an official visit of several days to Saudi Arabia at the invitation of his Saudi counterpart, Emir Saoud El Faycal. In a statement Belkhoja announced his satisfaction with the positive results of this visit, a result likely to strengthen fraternal relations and cooperation between the two countries, he said. The minister also said that he was honored to have been received during his stay in Saudi Arabia by King Khalid and Emir Fahd Ibn Abaelaziz, the crown prince and the vice president of the Council of Ministers. Next mentioning the talks he had had with the Saudi officials and especially with his counterpart Emir Saoud El Faycal, Belkhoja indicated that they had to do with questions of bilateral cooperation as well as current problems in the Arabo-Muslim world. He specifically stated that his talks with his Saudi counterpart were crowned by the signing of a cooperation accord between the two countries. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 27 Jun 80 p 4] 9380

CSO: 4400

MOSCOW ATTEMPTS TO MAKE PEACE AMONG AFGHAN COMMUNISTS

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 26 June 80 p 2

[Article by Abu Sayyed Anwar: "Russia Planning to Build Railway Line to Kabul"]

[Text] The ECONOMIST, a British periodical reports that according to some U.S. intelligence agents, the "small Soviet army" consisting of 83,000 soldiers has made its "temporary" stay permanent.

The presidential palace of Afghanistan has been converted into military headquarters. Another palace north of Kabul is being vacated for transformation into army quarters. Russian officers are establishing their own clubs in large cities. Also, the Russians are building their own cantonments ignoring already existing barracks of the Afghan army.

Security around airports is very strict. Anti air-raid guns are set up, and radar systems are being modernized with the latest equipment. Helipads are being built in Kabul and Bagram airports. Small airports are being constructed in Ghazni and Jalalabad.

Two bridges are being constructed on the rivers flowing between Russia and Afghanistan, and work is being done on building a railroad between Russia and Afghanistan. According to plans, it should be operational soon. Strong cellars are being built for storing ammunitions and arms. Small depots for supplying provisions are being erected in Kabul, Herat, (Shindada), (Kandoz), Jalalabad, Ghazni, Mazar-i-Sharif, and (Garvez). Similar kinds of activities are afoot in Badakhshan and (Kanaar) provinces.

In no place is there [a concentration of] even one division of the Russian army, but the activities in Afghanistan and the increased amenities around (Pul Khameeri) indicate that pretty soon more soldiers will be brought into the northern border areas of Afghanistan, and there does not seem to be any plan to send the present army back to Russia.

According to the ECONOMIST, it is commonly believed in the West that the Russian army is going to stay in Afghanistan. This belief is supported by

an article by A. Petrov in the 25 May issue of PRAVDA. The writings of this journalist are considered to represent Brezhnev's views.

Petrov writes that the question of recalling the Russian army from Afghanistan can be considered only when external interference in Afghanistan is stopped, and only when guarantee is given that no help will be provided to Karmala's opponents by external powers. In addition, the Russians demand removal of military bases in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Russia wants this area to be declared as "area of peace." But the U.S. does not only refuse to remove any military bases. On the contrary, Qaboos has promised to let the U.S. build another military base in this area. Thus, the question of Russian army returning from Afghanistan does not arise.

According to the ECONOMIST, Russia does not have enough troops to control the cities, much less the villages and mountain areas. However, it will bring reinforcements after the Olympic games.

A British weekly, commenting on the Afghan situation writes that the students were very active in the recent riots. Forty students were killed and a large number of them were wounded. These students belong to the Parcham group of the People's Democratic Party. All this is causing great difficulties for the Karmal government. Government officers in Kabul cannot go out of their offices. Meanwhile, the Russians are disturbed by the strife among the various factions in Afghanistan. The Russian army is puzzled by this turmoil and switching of loyalties. They cannot decide who is with them and who is against them. Result: massacre.

The internal strife between Afghan political groups has kept the rulers busy. Russia is trying to contact Tahir Shah in Italy after failing to resolve differences between the political groups. Perhaps he could help in restoring political stability. However, Tahir Shah has refused to return to his country on the basis of a mere Russian invitation. Recall of the Russian army and establishment of a national government top the list of his demands. But these demands are acceptable neither to the Russians nor to the members of Parcham and Khalq parties.

The serious difference between Parcham and Khalq do not seem to end. Karmal had included some of his political enemies in his cabinet under Russian pressure. Members of Parcham and Khalq have been called to Moscow time and again, but of no avail. Russia has made it clear to both parties that if they fail to reconcile, Tahir Shah will be brought in. It is believed in some circles that Tahir Shah is in Moscow now. Russia is bent upon ending this uncertainty in Afghan politics at any cost, as it has its designs on Iran also. It already has 60 thousand soldiers on the Afghanistan-Iranian border. Another 20 divisions are ready in Russia. The situation implies that Russia wants to get out of the mess it is in, even at the cost of establishing a weak government in Afghanistan.

The recall of the Russian army is out of the question. Therefore, it is very important for Russia to maintain the present government. However, we cannot call it a government.

MUSLIMS OF UZBEKISTAN, TADJIKISTAN ARE WAITING TO BE FREED

Quetta JANG in Urdu 7 Jun 80 pp 1,8

[Article: "Russia Attacked Afghanistan to Avert Mutiny in its Islamic Provinces; Muslims in Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan are Increasing Their Liberation Activities; Special Interview with Kabul University Professor Halim al-Din: 'Whole Islamic World Will be Overtaken by Communism if Afghanistan is not Helped'"]

[Text] Islamabad, 6 June--Professor Halim al-Din Raqam, Chairman of the Examinations Bureau at Kabul University and a prominent spiritual leader of Afghanistan, said that if all the Muslim world rallies to help the Afghan Mujahidin, not only can Afghanistan be liberated from the Russian yoke, but the Russian provinces of Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan can be freed also.

Professor Halim al-Din, who belongs to a Tadjik tribe, told the JANG representative in an exclusive interview that hundreds of thousands of Muslims in Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan are waiting to be freed from their communist rulers, and that people there have already been struggling against the communist rule. He said that in spite of continued efforts by Russia, the Muslims in those two provinces did not give up their Islamic rituals. They are still making their presence felt. He said that the Russians invaded Afghanistan in order to avert mutiny in these areas.

Professor Halim al-Din said that the people of Afghanistan are fighting the war for Islam. They do not have anything more than their religious zeal and old weapons. If the Islamic world remains quiet about the Afghan crisis not only Afghanistan, but the whole Islamic world would be taken over by the communists. He said that Muslims from Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan were being urged to fight in Afghanistan under the pretext that Afghanistan was under attack by America. These Muslims, however, withdrew from the war when they learned the truth. Therefore Russia recalled them from Afghanistan, fearing mutiny. He further said that if Afghanistan were freed from Russia, the people in Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan would increase their effort for freedom.

7997

CSO: 4263

AFGHANISTAN

ACCOUNTS OF SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN BY TOURISTS

Quetta JANG in Urdu 29 May 80 pp 1,4

[Article: "Kabul's Streets Drenched With Demonstrators' Blood; Russian Army losing Control of Students and People; No one Knows Who is Running Afghan Government"]

[Text] New Delhi, 28 May--Pamphlets distributed by Afghan students include slogans like: "Kill the Russians," and "The Russians are Killing Freedom Fighters in the Mountains, We Shall Kill them in Cities." Tourists arriving from Afghanistan observe that this action by the students against the Russian rule represents a new phase. The tourists further say that it is evident that the students are getting the better of the Russian army and the government.

A dry fruits merchant from Kabul say that children as young as eight years old are taking part in demonstrations. The merchant says that he came to India for treatment. He says that during the last six weeks more than 60 or 70 students have been killed. He says that Mohammed Taraki took power, there were demonstrations of Parcham people dressed in red. The present demonstrations are also in red, he says, but these are being carried out by the people, and the red color comes from the blood being shed.

An American diplomat says that the conditions in Kabul are very serious. A member of the Indian foreign office, who is an expert on Afghan affairs, says that the Karmal government has failed to control the situation in Ghazni and other places. Herat is totally under the control of the Mujahidin. He says that no one knows who is running the government in Kabul. Another diplomat says that Kabul is quiet now after several days of violence.

According to the experts on Afghan affairs in Indian foreign ministry, the Russians are facing difficulties, because of the students' demonstrations and other activities. The students are being forced to read communist literature urging them to help Russia. However, the students are full of hate for the Russian rule. Commenting on the girl students' demonstrations, these experts say that the purpose of these demonstrations is to get people's feelings fired up. Some guerilla citizens forces are also helping the girl-students.

BRIEFS

NEW AFGHAN PUBLICATION--Kabul 24 June--Hizb-i-Islami [Islamic Party] of Afghanistan has started publishing a new fortnightly magazine called KHAWAHAR SHAHEED, meaning the martyred sister magazine. The four-page magazine carries this heading, "This magazine is published by the students of Kabul University." The magazine is published in memory of the hundreds of girl-students killed by Russian fire. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu June 80 p 3]

CSO: 4203

REPORTAGE ON FLN CONGRESS (VI)

Balance of Congress Decisions Debated

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22 Jun 80 p 1

[Article: "Preparatory Commission Examines Measures Planned"]

[Excerpt] Algiers (APS)--The preparatory commission of the special party congress held a meeting presided over by Abdelmadiid Allahoum at the headquarters of the presidency of the republic.

During this meeting, the commission examined measures passed at the session of the special congress and evaluated activities and tasks entrusted to it during the congress.

The commission also examined the shortcomings revealed in terms of organization at all levels.

In another connection all the delegations from the wilayas and the national councils of the mass organizations which participated in the work of the congress left Algiers in compliance with the previously planned arrangements.

The commission also passed measures concerning the printing and classification of the resolutions of the congress.

Moreover, the messages addressed to the extraordinary congress of the FLN by the militants and cadres of the FLN, mass organizations and workers' assemblies reaffirm their indestructible support for the political leadership and its head, President Chadli Bendjedid, with respect to the concretization of the objectives contained in the National Charter.

These messages are sure to serve as reminders that the resolutions of the present congress should confirm the major base lines announced by brother Chadli Benjedid. The next plan should reflect the masses' aspirations in order to guarantee the continuity of the socialist revolution, the signers of messages emphasized.

Among other points raised by these messages, the one concerning the implementation of the principle of "the right man in the right place" should be emphasized.

Dialog Advocate

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22 Jun 80 p 3

[Article: "The Best Way to Solve the Problems: Constructive Dialog and Responsible Democracy"]

[Text] At a time when Algeria is preparing to begin the implementation at a time when it is delivering the means to set up the planning machinery, of the 5-year plan, at a time when it aspires more than ever to profit from the fruits of its development to realize its socioeconomic objectives, the problems of responsible democratic action are singularly prominent for it.

The implementation of responsible democratic action in the country's political, social and economic institutions was emphasized by President Chadli at the close of the FLN congress as a fundamental necessity and "the best way to solve the problems which our country is experiencing."

Constructive democratic dialog thus appears to be the major necessity of the hour with respect to development as the driving force in our general approach. Why? As for the special congress, let us say generally that the deficiencies to be overcome and the shortcomings with respect to forecasting, as well as everyday experience, have taught us that nothing can be built without the widest and most democratic consultation at the level of all basic institutions. As for the candor of the debates--desired by the head of state--we have no interest in concealing the ills undermining our economy, the prejudices hindering our society in its overall evolution or the false problems shackling our abilities to hit immediately upon a clarifying and mobilizing element.

The deepening of democracy is an imperative of which every militant convinced of the national cause is aware. It would take many deviations and concepts gone astray or poorly assimilated for one to be able to reach the point of questioning the revolutionary commitment and underrating the virtues of the practice of democracy at all levels. While anti-democratic shifts can be explained historically, revolutionary continuity exists at the level of convinced militants who have escaped the songs of the imperialist and reactionary sirens and who have remained basically convinced of what is called in a marvelous periphrasis "the people's cause." These militants of the social equality and democracy which November contemplated are the living conscience of this revolutionary continuity.

Nonetheless--and this is the Algerian Revolution's strong point--social forces within the party--workers fellaheen, young people, women, djounoud--have taken charge of the ability to deepen democracy. Economic development

and planning requirements are not the sole affair of technocrats or bureaucrats. They are above all the problem of the masses. The latter can take charge of them only within a democratic framework in which the popular masses can find opportunity for mobilization, social organization and true implementation of the National Charter.

Democracy as a principle is an historic attainment of our people. They have not failed to display the virtues of patriotic unity or austerity and the masses of the December 1960 demonstrations made the supreme sacrifice for the survival of the Revolution. We are dealing with a people inured to hardship. The death of President Houari Boumedienne should have been an ideal opportunity for destabilization of the country. It was nothing of the sort thanks to our people's political maturity. On the day after the extraordinary congress this same people is looking not only for implementation of the national charter but also for guidance and revolutionary decisions.

President Chadli Bendjedid, who gave a concrete picture of the FLN's democratic experience, struck a responsive chord with our people and acted on their profound desires for revolutionary mobilization. The work should be accompanied by this implementation of responsible democracy, cooperation and openness to the popular concerns.

This fruitful dialog between the leadership and the masses been deepened and established as a method to be followed in the party and the state. Any measure, any decision violating this principle will impede the advance of the revolution and will hinder the country's socioeconomic development. Daily use of constructive dialog is not only the social forces' guarantee of being mobilized for the concretization of the plan but also a living example of a revolution which is advancing along the path to socialism. Democracy is not, then, just an expression in a slogan or speech but an imperative which has a concrete content: national independence, the mobilization of the working masses, a better life thanks to social progress, the triumph of militant action over opportunism, and anti-imperialist action.

Preparation for Plan Implementation

Algiers EL MOUJAHID in French 22 Jun 80 p 3

[Article: "Creating All Conditions for Implementation of the Plan"]

[Text] Algiers (APS)--During the 5 days of the work of the special party congress the majestic cupola of the Olympic Complex long resounded with the aspirations for greater social justice and respect for the dignity of the Algerian at home as well as abroad, a connotation democratically given by the members of the congress to the concept of a better life.

It could not have been otherwise after the democratic content of the debate on the plan, which was established as the fundamental principle well before

the first day of the congress. After making a socioeconomic evaluation devoid of complacency of the decade of development from 1967-1978, the congress, which ran its course on 15-19 June, disclosed the major lines of recovery.

The latter are contained in the 5-year plan, a true monument which includes down to the finest details the recipes to be followed in order to meet the popular masses' social needs. It remained to refine the directions for its implementation, to give it a soul and especially to create all necessary conditions for its strict implementation. In other words, to put the party in a position to control implementation of the plan efficiently by strengthening its political leadership through greater cohesiveness.

This dialectical liaison between the plan and men was the historic task of the extraordinary congress, the success of which, as of this writing, augurs a leap forward for the socialist revolution and anti-imperialism.

What is more, as guide to this Algerian socialist revolution and in order better to mobilize the popular masses--who increasingly crave social justice and dignity--the FLN owes it to itself to dynamize its base by admitting revolutionary elements working in the spirit of the charter. The tasks which the FLN faces require greater vigilance. More concretely, it is a question of guaranteeing economic independence and a better life for the people in the face of the multinationals' appetites and, in order to do so, to avoid all social evils denounced during the debates, such as theft, waste, corruption, nepotism and opportunism. At this factual level it is necessary to make renewal of the party a preliminary. The three criteria of commitment, competence and integrity will preside over admittance to the party; they are sufficient to sort the wheat from the chaff and to open the ranks of the party to all patriots who give evidence of them.

Didn't the general secretary of the party, in his closing speech call on all patriots who believe in the FLN's statutes and the National Charter to rejoin the ranks of the FLN in order to build a society based on principles and not on men?

The repercussions of this ideological ferment created by the debates of the congress--and who can fail to remember those which preceded the adoption of the National Charter--emphasize, if nothing else, a great capacity for rectifying mistakes. Isn't the objective of the plan based essentially on popular aspirations and (it should be emphasized, because it has been mentioned many times, both by the general secretary of the party and by the members of the congress) the oath made to the martyrs?

Another noteworthy point of junction after that between the plan and men is that between the moujahidine of the war of liberation and the first generations of socialist building. The farmers' presence in the congress reminded the latter of the virtues of total commitment to a noble cause, of perseverance in the effort, self-denial and sacrifice as well as of the values which enabled the people to seize their political independence and which will make it possible for them to attain a better life.

Masses Pleased With Congress

Algiers EL MOULIAHED in French 20-21 Jun 80 p 1

[Article: "An Echo Spreading Among the Popular Masses"]

[Text] On the day following the extraordinary congress of the FLN our country is again confronting its destiny and our people are facing a new challenge. A challenge on which the country's future will depend: the 5-year plan. In fact this is a challenge which involves such decisive stakes as the building of an independent national economy and the establishment of social progress.

The congress has completed its work. Without any doubt, conclusions must be drawn from it. These conclusions are numerous, and many of them are very instructive. But the best, the most accurate and the most useful of all is that we must be careful not to lose sight of the fact that in order to ensure a better life for the citizens the main thing is not what has been accomplished but what is yet to come.

The main thing begins now. It is what remains to be done, what must be done in each day's work and on all levels: laborious effort and militant action with a view to implementing the objectives of the 5-year plan and to strengthening the patriotic and revolutionary current of the national charter and the socialist option of our country and our people.

The FLN special congress will have had two principal merits: that of having defined objectives and methods for economic and social development which are consistent with the national interest and which produce responses appropriate to our people's aspirations and hopes. And that of having introduced the principle of building machinery capable of bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the implementation of the complex tasks of national development and revolutionary construction, something which had never been done in the past.

"The right man in the right place:" this is the slogan which is spreading among the popular masses and which has deeply permeated the work of the special congress. It is in response to two motivations, both equally rooted in the masses' consciousness: a moral motivation, that of doing justice to the sacrifices, the effort and the privations which our people have always agreed to without bargaining, although a category of citizens is building fortunes with lightning speed and shamelessly leading a lordly way of life. The second motivation is of a political nature. It is in response to the necessity of putting an end to the nepotism, corruption and bureaucracy which certain officials are setting up as a line of conduct. It also aims at throwing out of the institutions those who consciously or unconsciously are working at cross-purposes to the line of the national charter, those there who only wrap themselves in the revolutionary toga to conceal their secret practices, the tepidity of their convictions or their hostility to the national objectives.

It is important to make the political point of view prevail over the moral point of view. This is definitively what President Chadli called on the Algerian people to do during the closing session of the congress. Cleaning up the institutions and conferring responsibilities on those who are best able to assume them, are political tasks. As such, they cannot be the spanage of a judge. These tasks stem from a long and exacting labor, and because of this they are the concern of all militants, officials and citizens.

Rigorous selection of men to whom responsibilities are entrusted is a necessary condition for forging instruments appropriate for the realization of the tasks of this stage of national building. A necessary condition, but not sufficient. In order for it to be sufficient, it is indispensable to develop methods capable of guaranteeing the adequate functioning of these institutions. In this perspective, constructive dialogue within the institutions is the only way and the only solution. Responsible democracy, as the president of the republic emphasized, is the principle to follow in order to serve the National Charter and to offer the party the ability to carry out the tasks of leadership, stimulation and control in order to achieve the construction of the socialist society to which we aspire.

The party of the National Liberation Front is the force on which the historic responsibility of directing the political, economic and social building of the nation is incumbent. At the present stage, it is responsible for the realization of the 5-year plan. That means it is necessary and urgent for the FLN to consolidate itself, to strengthen itself to the point of becoming the great party of the vanguard that the National Charter describes, the mobilizer of the masses, the liberator of society and the builder of progress.

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LATE SHAH FEARED RUSSIA WOULD BE INVITED TO MOVE INTO IRAN

Cairo OCTOBER in Arabic 29 Jun 80 pp 19-24

[Report on interview with late shah of Iran, at his residence in Egypt on 15 May 1980, by Anis Mansur]

[Text] The shah said to me:

My mistake was that I was excessively democratic.

I took a 10-year leap forward.

Iran is marching toward communism.

Out of fear for my son, I averted more bloodshed in Iran.

I sat waiting for the King of Kings, Shahanshah, light of the Aryans, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. I did not know what he would look like now.

But I knew what he looked like the day I first saw him at the Festival of Cyrus the Great in Tehran and Persepolis. France had made the most beautiful clothes and air-conditioned tents for the occasion. Planes brought hot meals from Maxime's Restaurant in Paris. France had designed the uniforms of his soldiers. England had set up the street-lighting system. And the Shahanshah had brought together kings and heads of state from all over the world to celebrate with him the memory of King Cyrus, founder of the Persian state and tolerant king who freed the Jews and returned them to Jerusalem. The Shahanshah really looked like a King of Kings. He was a picture of elegance, splendor, pomp, and majesty. He had a golden-brown complexion and diamond-like radiance. He had healthy-looking eyes, a sound body, firm lips, and he stood up straight. He was a real King of Kings.

The next time I saw the shah, he had just left his country and was getting off the plane in Aswan. Was it a coincidence that he got off his plane, "the Eagle," as the sun was setting? The sun, though, sets and rises every day. Would his sun rise again later on after having just set? The

laws of the sun are very different from the laws of kings. Kings whose sun has set are gone forever. But it so happened that the sunset helped provide needed psychological camouflage. In place of the pale yellow of death, it naturally gave the complexion of the Shahanshah and his wife the Shahbanu the golden yellow color of the pharaohs. The shah's eyes looked to me like two frozen teardrops. But in the eyes of some of those present there were real, live teardrops.

Had the sun held up its sunset for a while, it would have been the second time in history that it had done so. The sun delayed its sunset when Joshua the Jew was fighting his enemies. The sun waited until he was victorious in battle. The sun could have waited a little this time to help the shah triumph over sadness, sorrow and regret as he faced the outside world.

President Sadat gave the shah a ride in an open car through Aswan. Sadat was hoping that the shah would cheer up and that his spirits would get a lift from the cheers of the good-hearted masses of Egyptians who were very grateful to him. The shah had stood by Egypt in times of tribulation. The applause and the cheers which greeted his motorcade were simply an expression of this gratitude. Of course, what the Egyptians did was no more than light a small candle, albeit a sincere one, in the shah's night of pitch darkness.

When the shah returned to Egypt from Panama, a sick man fleeing with his body and soul, fearful that he might not die in peace, it was the third time that he had looked for a place to spend his remaining days. He had nowhere to turn, and nobody would take him. The Koranic verse, "His wealth and riches were of no help to him," was applicable to the shah. He was fleeing from people, hoping he could flee from his own blood. For the fact is that death was in his red cells, deep inside his body. He came to Cairo barely alive. But the little life that remained in him consisted of a sharp mind, a will of iron, and a crystal-clear memory.

When I saw him this time, to interview him by himself, I was facing the window. The sun was in my eyes, and I could not see him clearly. I could not very well say: "Please move over from the darkness, so that I can see you better." The shadow he was in was heavy and thick. He was no longer interested in being in the sun, which sets and rises, because his sun had already set and there was no hope that it would ever rise again.

I found him to be paler and thinner than I expected. And when the rays of the sun fell on his hair, it looked sparse. It was neither white nor yellow. It was a mixture of fading light and deep darkness. Darkness had started to envelope him from head to toe.

But I remembered the wisdom of our great teacher Socrates when he said that one of his pupils was not speaking. He said to him: "Speak up, so that I may see you."

And now the emperor was going to speak so that I could see him. I was going to completely avoid talking about politics. I was going to ask him questions about literature, philosophy and history. That way I would draw him out. It would not be humane, or wise, to talk to him about events in Iran, or about his hardships. Besides, the emperor had already talked about all of this in his memoirs which appeared under the title A REPLY TO HISTORY, and were published as a series in the magazine OCTOBER.

I already knew that he read philosophy and literature and that he memorized poetry. But like all kings, he hides his true feelings, because to betray his feelings would mean to show weakness. For that reason, he lives under an iron mask--a mask of his own making. All kings are like the knights of the middle ages who covered themselves with dull, suffocating masks. But these were the only means of protecting themselves from people.

No matter how hard, heavy, cold and dull armor might be, it was still better for the knights to wear it than to walk around as other people did, naked and barefoot, and expose themselves to some deadly wooden arrow shot by some youth!

[I was daydreaming.] I recalled that when I was in Tehran in the Shahanshah's Throne Room, I looked to the right, to the left and all around. When I saw nobody else, I sneaked up to the Peacock Throne and sat on it. I committed this silly picture of myself to memory. I wanted to feel for just a moment the power of this eternal kingdom. What I found was that the throne was dull and hard. It was made of gold and precious stones, but the precious stones were just as cold as ordinary stones. It was just like sitting on a sidewalk.

Of course, this is not the opinion of those who sit on the throne, or crave it. Nor is it the opinion of those who stand, kneel and prostrate themselves before it, be they sincere or hypocritical. It is only the opinion of the fox who climbed the grapevine, and, when he failed to grab anything, said: "Sour grapes!" When I felt that the precious stones were cold, I was really saying "Sour grapes."

I do not know how long I was in this state of stupor. When I recovered, I saw a hand outstretched toward me, I extended mine. The shah seated himself, and I sat down. I was awake now, and he was ready. As is his custom, he leaned back in his chair and stretched his legs. With his indifferent, wandering eyes, he looked through his glasses beyond me, far beyond me. I wanted to ask questions that would draw me closer to him, not dig through his skin into his very flesh.

I said: "Your Majesty, you seem to be in good health."

His lips tightened, and he shook his head. He had often heard this traditional beginning of an interview. Or, perhaps, he had forgotten all about this social hypocrisy during the last year and a half, and had left it, along with everything else, behind him in Iran. He said: "As you know,

I had to undergo extensive and serious surgery. But now I feel much better. My weight right now is 63 kilograms. The doctor feels that it is necessary that I weigh 70 kilograms, and that it would be even better if my weight were 72 kilograms."

I asked: "I have learned that Your Majesty takes walks every day."

He answered: "I walk for an hour every day. In the summer, I hope to do some swimming. It is the best treatment there is."

I asked: "Will it be your only treatment?"

He answered: "No. I require constant medical treatment. Right now, I am trying chemotherapy. The doctors are injecting a mixture of chemical substances into my veins. It is a large dose which requires half an hour to administer. It is difficult and exhausting. The purpose of this chemotherapy is to maintain control over my blood cells which are exposed to the risk of cancer."

Judging by the anxiety, refined though it was, which was apparent on his face and in his movements, I was sure that he was not expecting questions such as these concerning his health. This anxiety encouraged me to draw closer to him. I said: "Your Majesty follows the news of the world, East and West?"

He straightened up a little in his seat, assumed an alert position, and said: "Of course. This is a 50-year old habit."

[Question] And you are aware of the books which have been published concerning the revolution against you in Iran?

[Answer] I have read some of these books.

[Question] The book by Fereyduun Hoveyda [THE FALL OF THE SHAH], for example?

[Answer] He was the prime minister's brother, and was one of our supporters. But he had a great need for money. I have told the whole story in my memoirs entitled A REPLY TO HISTORY. However, I intend to add a chapter to the English version. Then I will send this chapter to you so that you can publish it in your magazine OCTOBER. My memoirs stop in September 1978. For this reason, it is necessary to add quite a few more things to them. I have followed events, watched television, seen the UN debates, and received a lot of information. I have seen, understood, analyzed, and deduced why all of this happened in my country.

[Question] Is all of this not made clear in Your Majesty's memoirs?

[Answer] My book requires clarifications and needs to view matters from various angles. The book also requires a discussion of some of the

interpretations and falsehoods which have caused events to be viewed in imaginary frameworks. In my memoirs, I pointed out that what has happened now in Iran had already happened in 1907, when the British and the Russians divided the country between them. After that, the British and the Americans went and offered Stalin and Molotov another gift, that is, that the Turkish and Kurdish provinces of Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Khuzistan be granted autonomy.

We opposed the wishes of Stalin and the wishes of a number of my advisers, and we succeeded. This was the first time we had stood up to the Soviets. In this regard, we took the position of Tito in 1948.

This was the old policy toward Iran: dismember the country and grant autonomy to parts of it. If this would happen in any one province, all of the others would quickly follow suit, and it would be the end of the Iranian state and Iranian nationality.

Or perhaps they wanted Iran to be a buffer zone between India and Russia. This is also an old British policy. Iran was supposed to be this "no man's land."

This British policy will be of no use this time. The reason is that if present conditions of anarchy and disintegration in Iran continue, Iranian patriots who are loyal to us will not succeed in mounting any opposition, because Iran will become a communist country in a very short time.

What we see in Iran now is not a regime. Iran now has an unemployment figure of 4 million people. The government--if you can call it a government--has eaten up all the reserves we left behind. Right now, they get money any way they can. They are forcing people to pay taxes. In Iran, there are many people who are unable to pay taxes. For this reason, the government has taken a loan of 10 billion dollars from the Central Bank. Also, there is no production. And inflation has shot up 300 percent since we left the country. This is the present situation in Iran.

[Question] What is it that makes Your Majesty believe that a Shiite nation such as Iran would become communist so quickly?

[Answer] Because Iran already cannot find enough food to eat, and because nobody could feed Iran or give it anything to drink. Thus, communism would be inevitable. Iran is now far away from religion. These crimes that are being committed every day, the blood which is being spilled, and the prisons which are being jammed with innocent people--you cannot call this religion. Furthermore, they keep telling our people: "You are a nation of wretched beggars." This is instead of telling them: "You have the capability to become a first-class nation."

What this means is that people are always having to wait until morsels of food are thrown to them so that they do not die of hunger. This is something which kills motivation. It wastes talents.

Moreover, the clerics are plundering everything, although they are setting aside some money, food and privileges for those who fight to defend them. In Iran they have already killed off the upper class. This could happen in any country, and in any revolution. But in Iran they have already dealt a fatal blow to the next class. And they have already prepared to annihilate the third class.

This means that Iran is going to become a nation consisting of fourth and fifth classes of miserable, desperate people who are writhing in pain and dying of hunger in a land which is rich.

For example, they have shut down nuclear reactors, they have let the bridges crumble, and they have stopped running the power plants. I used to produce 5 million barrels of oil a day, and now they are producing 1 million barrels a day. There is no income, and there are no taxes.

This is why I believe that the Iranian people right now are crawling on their bellies toward a communist regime. Under communism they would find order and food to eat. People would work and receive wages. At least the country would progress materially. People would become slaves, but just like people who are in jail, they would at least have something to eat!

[Question] Your Majesty, in your memoirs you did not make it clear to what extent the Americans were responsible for what happened.

[Answer] (He avoided answering this and said:) I am going to clarify this in the chapter which I am going to be sending to you to publish in your great and respectable magazine OCTOBER.

[Question] I thank Your Majesty for your esteem of our magazine. But tell me, Your Majesty, who are those who are helping Khomeyni, or who are those who helped him and backed him in the past?

[Answer] Those who are helping him are all of those who are profiting from this anarchy.

[Question] Up until very recently, the prevailing belief or speculation was that the West wanted to help this regime--even though you cannot call it a regime.

[Answer] Through Bazargan, who is an old client of the British and the Americans. Perhaps he is more of a client of the British.

[Question] And they tried to help President Bani-Sadr.

[Answer] Who?

[Question] The West.

[Answer] But not the Americans! [sic] The West was prepared to give a type of autonomy to Kurdistan. As I told you a few minutes ago, if you give autonomy to any one of the provinces, the other provinces would follow suit. I heard on the radio that an international committee is going to Iran to see what can be done with regard to the hostages. And I heard that there are going to be some sort of absurd elections there. I do not believe that Mr Bani-Sadr will get a majority of votes. The majority of votes will go to the religious parties. For this reason, it is not clear what the future will be.

[Question] Khomeyni is the foundation of this regime, Your Majesty.

[Answer] (In a quick burst of anger, he said:) Khomeyni? He is an evil, backward man. He lives in an age which has come and gone.

[Question] Has Your Majesty ever met him?

[Answer] I have never seen him. Seventeen years ago he was completely unknown. It was really absurd when he started attacking the "White Revolution" which we had launched. For that reason, we exiled him abroad. Instead of putting him in jail, we let him stay alive and leave the country.

[Question] Your Majesty, were you the one who arranged for him to go to France in particular?

[Answer] No, I did not. He went to Turkey and to Iraq. He stayed in Iraq for 14 years, and did not cease his activities. At that time, our government asked Iraq how it could let a man such as this practice openly hostile activity toward Iran. Iraq then expelled him. He tried to go to Kuwait, but the Kuwaitis would not let him enter their country. So he went to Syria, and from Syria he went to France, where he settled in a suburb close to Paris.

[Question] But some political analysts emphasize that his going to Paris was in compliance with your wishes.

[Answer] No, that is not true. The French asked us what they should do with this man. We did not know what to tell them. Whether he was in Paris or Hamburg made no difference.

[Question] There is speculation to the effect that the president of France, Giscard d'Estaing, reported all details of events in Iran to the heads of state who met on the island of Guadeloupe, and that he is the one who asked President Carter to get in touch with Khomeyni.

[Answer] I have heard this. But I do not know the exact details, although I could well imagine what some of them might be.

[Question] Your Majesty, based on current events and based on your complete knowledge of the history of Iranian-Iraqi relations, do you expect war to break out between the two countries?

[Answer] I do not expect a war. It is possible that long skirmishes and clashes will occur, but I do not expect a war.

[Question] Some Arabs were alarmed by your leaving the country. But in spite of this, these Arab countries did not try to adopt a clear position for or against you, or for or against Khomeyni.

[Answer] Some Arabs are happy that I left the country.

[Question] And some of them are afraid. This is because Khomeyni has not restored the feeling of security which they lost when you were in Iran.

[Answer] (He said in a flush of anger:) I do not know why the Arabs would have fears. What were they afraid of? If Islam gives a feeling of security, Khomeyni does not represent Islam. And if the Shiite doctrine gives rise to fears, this killing, this jailing, banishing and starving of people, and this destruction do not represent the Shiite doctrine. Perhaps they have domestic fears.

[Question] Maybe the cause of their fear are the Shiites in the Arab countries.

[Answer] Trampling on human dignity and shedding the blood of innocent persons has nothing to do with the Shiite doctrine. The Shiite doctrine is innocent of this. From Egypt I have been observing and following events, and I have been growing sadder and sadder about what is happening to my people and to my country.

[Question] Your Majesty, why did you decide to come to Egypt?

[Answer] When I came to Aswan [from Iran], President Sadat and his wife invited me to stay in Egypt. President Sadat was sensitive, gracious, and generous. He was more than a brother, because it is possible for a person to have an evil brother. President Sadat is a generous and trustworthy brother. He insistently pressed me to stay in Egypt. We never forgot this sincere invitation. We remained in constant contact with President Sadat and his gracious wife, Mrs Sadat. President Sadat went much farther than issuing a simple invitation when he arranged for the invitation to be extended to me officially through the People's Assembly. As long as I live, I will never forget this generosity and courage of his. History will never forget it either. President Sadat has made many great decisions.

When we were in Panama, and were faced with what was going on there, we remembered this invitation which was extended to us by President Sadat and

his gracious wife. We remembered the deep and sincere welcome that he had extended to us. The choice was not difficult. We decided to come to Egypt, and we succeeded in getting here. It is the best decision that we have made since we left our country.

[Question] Your Majesty, when you went to Morocco, you were expected to stay there for a long time, perhaps even permanently.

[Answer] We did live there for several months. But we did not want to inconvenience his majesty, King Hassan II. For that reason, we left for the Bahamas, and then to Mexico. I sent my children to the United States, and they finished their studies there last September. I was sick most of the time. Then I had trouble with my spleen. So I went to a hospital in New York, and 48 hours later we decided on surgery. It was at that time that the hostages were taken at the American embassy in Tehran. This represented tremendous negligence on the part of the government. The Americans had believed the government of the client Bazargan, when he told them that he would see to the complete safety of the American Embassy and those who were in it. But Iran had no government. The "government" in office was not even able to protect buildings and houses around the prime minister's office. So they took the hostages, and you know the rest. It was natural for all this to happen, as long as Iran had no government and no regime!

In Iran, they now ask the medical student, after only a few months of study, to become a doctor and treat patients.

In addition to the absence of law, science is disappearing. This is what Khomeyni proclaimed when he said: "We do not need foreign doctors. We are capable of producing a great number of doctors." Indeed, he is an insane, illiterate man!

[Question] He is the opposite of what Your Majesty wanted for your country. You had decided to "westernize" Iran, that is, to make it an advanced, westernized nation. The westernization, development or modernization process was rapid and headstrong. It is said that this is the philosophy which led to the revolution against you. It is said that this revolutionary process led to a deepening of the gulf between the various classes in Iran.

[Answer] (He pulled back and straightened up in his seat. It was as if he had rearranged his body or put his head back very carefully on his shoulders, to respond to this decisive and fatal issue. He said:) In recent years I did go as far and as fast as possible with "westernization" and development. It was a very big and rapid change, and I was extremely attentive to it. However, it proceeded without bloodshed. To me, the important thing was to mobilize people and to push them forward as forcefully and as rapidly as possible. I wanted to force them to become civilized. But now, when I look back, I can see the mistakes more clearly.

[Question] What were your mistakes, Your Majesty? And which of them has Khomeyni rectified?

[Answer] My mistake must have been my eagerness to be excessively democratic.

[Question] How do you mean?

[Answer] For example, I freed political prisoners and terrorists, and gave powers to a government which, at that time, was worthless. But my biggest mistake was the fact that I retreated, retreated, and always retreated in the face of pressure by the people, groups, and organizations. After that, the options I was left with were very difficult. For that reason, I decided to take a vacation, and that was my way out of the dilemma. From the constitutional point of view, everything was properly set up. There was a royal council, a legitimate government approved by the parliament, and an army which had taken an oath of loyalty to me. But when I left the country, the army crumbled. (At this point, the shah took several long deep sighs. He then bent his head. I myself caught my breath, and waited.)

[Question] Is Your Majesty sorry about what has happened?

[Answer] I am very sorry about what has happened to my country. I had prepared a 19-point revolution for my country. These points were unlike anything in the history of any other nation. Each point was something unique that no one else before me had introduced in his country.

I expected that Iran, by 1983, would be a powerful nation. When we left Iran, the average income per person was \$2,520. It would have been possible for this figure to reach \$4,000 by today.

By the year 2000, Iran was going to be modern and advanced like any European country. Militarily, too. Iran was going to have one of the greatest and most advanced armies in the world.

[Question] Your Majesty, what is the purpose of all this military power and all these extremely expensive and advanced weapons?

[Answer] What is wrong with an ancient, cohesive nation having a strong army? It would have been possible, by means of this army, to save the Middle East.

I had no foreign ambitions.

And I can say that if I were in Iran, none of what happened in Afghanistan would have taken place.

[Question] Would it have been possible for Your Majesty to stop the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

[Answer] The Russians would have thought twice before embarking on such an invasion. And even if they had not, it would not have been possible for the things that happened in (Baluchistan) to happen [sic]. It would not have been possible for Soviet troops to advance to the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, or Persian Gulf. This is why it was necessary for us to have military strength and a modern army.

[Question] Who does Your Majesty think will be the next victim of the Soviets?

[Answer] As I said to you before, if the patriots in Iran do not do anything, Iran itself will be the next victim. And this will come from within, that is, some groups in Iran will invite Russia to occupy Iran.

[Question] Will not the Americans and Western countries do anything?

[Answer] The West? Did the West do anything when the Soviets went into Czechoslovakia and Hungary? The Soviet principle concerning intervention has been usually to intervene first and receive the invitation later!

There is no escape from communism in Iran. If the patriots do not stage a revolution, the state will throw itself at the feet or into the arms of the communists. It makes absolutely no difference whether Iran throws itself at their feet or into their arms. The important thing is that Iran will be forced to plunge into the abyss of communism.

As for the Western nations, they are preoccupied with their own interests only. They are preoccupied with where to go for summer and winter vacations, with housing problems, with slowing the arms race, with selling arms to other countries, and with entente between America and Russia.

You can interpret these things as you wish. But this is the way the Western world is. They accept the status quo, and wait to see what will happen next.

[Question] Your Majesty, it is not clear from this conversation or from your memoirs what the Arab role or reaction has been with regard to the events in Iran.

[Answer] The actual reaction has been fear.

[Question] Fear of what?

[Answer] God knows what they are afraid of! Perhaps fear is a pathological Arab symptom. Or, perhaps, their fear is due to the delicate domestic conditions in the Arab countries.

[Question] Some of the emirates in the Gulf were very afraid of you. Some of them are now very afraid of Khomeyni. They are always afraid of Iran!

[Answer] They had no reason to be afraid [of me], I was always one of their best friends. If what you have in mind is that they became more fearful after Iran regained the three islands in the Persian Gulf, the fact is that I did not seize them. I merely regained them from the British who had stolen them from Iran.

[Question] Your Majesty says that it is possible for patriotic Iranians to do something about Khomeyni. To what degree are you certain of this?

[Answer] Unfortunately, I do not have sufficient information. The situation is very difficult, and very complicated. This is due to the fact that there is a lack of means of communication. Patriotic Iranians who are opposed to Khomeyni represent the overwhelming majority, but they are not organized. Besides, the weapons are now in the hands of the mob.

[Question] Your Majesty, would it be possible for us to give a psychological interpretation to what happened in Iran? What I mean is, could we give history a personal, psychological interpretation? We could say that Khomeyni was motivated to start a revolution against you, because your father killed his father and you killed his son. Would this be enough reason for everything that happened? Does it not happen that revolutions and wars break out because of the death of one person? I am thinking, for example, of World War I which started in 1914 when an Austrian prince was assassinated, and the Trojan War which took place because of Helen.

(The shah was not pleased with this question or with this oversimplification of the world's historic events and revolutions, even though history is like a train pulled by huge locomotives represented by exceptional individuals--persons driven by noble anger or the sweet taste of revenge.)

[Answer] Nothing ever happened to his father. His father died a natural death. Moreover, his father was not an Iranian. Also, I did not kill his son. Khomeyni is an evil man by nature. He does not need the death of his father or of his son to spur him on to commit bloodshed or to desecrate my father's grave in order to bury his mother-in-law there.

[Question] But, Your Majesty, how do you explain this man's popularity and the fact that millions rally around him?

[Answer] Blood. They want blood!

[Question] Does Your Majesty mean that all of these millions of people are bloodthirsty?

[Answer] Yes. As long as they rally around him, march behind him, and are happy with the degradation and torture he is meting out to them; and as long as they simply stand and watch the country being destroyed, without revolting, it must be that they are satisfied with this. He has thus managed to instill evil bloodthirsty passion among the masses.

The man is insane. He denies the entire 2,500-year old history of Iran. He believes that Iran's history begins with him, and that everything that happened before him was not important and should be ignored. Do you not feel that this, though tragic, is also comic?

[Question] Your Majesty, I noticed that you say "the Persian Gulf," whereas we say "the Arabian Gulf," or simply "the Gulf."

[Answer] The name "Persian Gulf" is a historical fact. On all of the maps of the world you will see "Persian Gulf." Even President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir used to call it "the Persian Gulf." The name "Arabian Gulf" is an Arab invention. I saw "Arabian Gulf" for the first time in the British newspaper THE TIMES in the fifties. It was perhaps in 1956 or in 1957. Maybe that was the reason why the Arabs started clinging to this name. And you know that some Arab countries live on slogans.

They turned the name into a slogan. What is the use of changing historic or geographic names? You have, for example, the Indian Ocean. Why does it have this name? Why is it not called the African Ocean? Also, you could call the Red Sea "the Arabian Sea."

Furthermore, why do they not call it "the Islamic Gulf"? We are Moslems, and not all of us are Arabs. In fact, the majority of Moslems are not Arabs.

[Question] Your Majesty, do you think that what happened in Iran will have any repercussions in the Moslem republics in the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Yes. The Soviets will say to their Moslems: "Do you want to become like Iran? Is this what Islam is all about? Do you want anarchy, bloodshed, hunger, destruction, unemployment, and disintegration?"

[Question] Was it then one of Your Majesty's goals to catapult Iran far ahead of the Soviet Moslem republics, and cut off ties between them and Iran, by developing Iran and driving it toward the West instead of toward the East?

[Answer] Yes. But this was not all. In Iran we have all of the elements which could make us a first-class nation. We have oil, land, and minerals. We have new processes for converting iron into steel by using natural gas. We have cadres who have received the most modern training that modern science can give. We have all of the prerequisites to make Iran a first-class nation. The "rapid pace of development" was not the only reason for what happened. Another reason was the introduction of comprehensive, large-scale social reforms. In the 14 points of my revolution, you will find that agricultural workers will be working for themselves. We introduced the idea that the workers should share in the profits, with them owning 49 percent of the factories.

We have ideas and theories which can be beneficial to our country. Of course it is not possible for us to choose for Iran a Swiss or Swedish type of democracy, without taking into account our own different traditions and particular circumstances. And I think that only confused people borrow from the West without thinking what it is that they are borrowing.

[Question] Your Majesty did not wish to answer a previous question of mine which concerns whether or not anyone helped Khomeyni.

[Answer] I do not know. All I can say is that there existed a certain "will" that I should leave Iran. They wanted me to leave, because I was independent in my thinking, actions, and plans for the future of my country. Perhaps I was more independent than I should have been!

[Question] But those who backed Khomeyni or helped to get Your Majesty to leave the country did not gain anything from it!

[Answer] History is always like this. If people could learn anything from history, these mistakes would not happen, and there would be no miscalculations. History has taught us not to learn anything from it!

[Question] Did everything happen suddenly?

[Answer] It did not happen suddenly. They had been preparing for it, at least 2 years in advance.

[Question] And nobody in all of Iran knew about it?

[Answer] Not exactly!

[Question] Did the Iranian intelligence service, the patriots, government officials and others not know anything about preparations to overthrow you?

[Answer] Not exactly, not exactly! But I decided to leave for the sake of democracy in the country, and for the sake of its peace and security. As long as this was the state of public opinion, I had to leave in the face of a multitude of pressures. I had to grant many new freedoms and to continually back down in the face of these pressures. Then everything began to move against me, and after that nothing could stop it.

[Question] What was the result of all of this hasty democracy?

[Answer] It was suicidal. It would have been better and sounder if everything had happened in the space of 10 years, bearing in mind our geographic circumstances and our traditions.

It was a mistake which others will perhaps learn from and not repeat. Right now I see everything clearly. I see all of my mistakes.

One of my fatal mistakes was that I blindly trusted the West. The friendship of the West was something which I took for granted. I was blind. After I placed complete trust in this friendship, I quickly proceeded to do what I wished to do for my country. I gave my country much more than it was able to digest.

[Question] Your Majesty, what was it that made you so nervous and made you decide to leave your country without cleaning house or even looking behind you?

[Answer] I have a theory, which is that a hereditary monarchy is a very difficult matter. This is because every decision I take will affect my son later on. Thus, I decided not to commit bloodshed, because I did not want my son to have to pay for it. In the hereditary monarchy system, it is necessary to think about what will happen when you are gone. If the person who will take your place is your son, the situation can be very difficult.

[Question] Your Majesty, when you left Iran did you feel that this was the end of the monarchy?

[Answer] Well, I do not know. Everybody was telling me that it would be best if I took a vacation, for a month or two. But the cause was the American Gen Huyser, who came before my departure. He did not want to get in touch with me as is customary. He set everything up to drive me to depart. If it were not for this particular man, nothing would have happened.

[Question] Did America make a miscalculation, because the situation turned against her later on?

[Answer] Let us wait and see what the results will be. We will see what the Americans have gained and what they have lost. We will see what the Russians will have gained. And we will see what is left over for the Iranian people, in the alleged name of Islam, or rather in the name of what pretends to be Islam. [End of interview].

I put down my cup of tea. The shah pointed out that I had used no sugar in it. I did not intend this to have any significance or bearing on this sad interview. I rose, and the shah extended his hand to me. It was the hand of a man who had lost two crowns, the crown of kingship and the crown of good health. In front of the door I ran across two of his daughters who had been riding horseback. They were children full of life and innocence, who do not realize what has happened. In any case, they were playing, and were getting kisses from relatives who were coming and going. Their destiny will be to live in a foreign world, far from the Iran which put the largest of shining crowns on the head of the shah, and then replaced it with the largest of black turbans. As I was going down the long, wide steps, the sun of Sunday, 15 May 1980 had already set, and buried itself behind a thick layer of clouds. I understood what the sun was trying to tell me!

ISLAMIZATION CAMPAIGN STIRS HOSTILE REACTION FROM WOMEN

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Jul 80 p 7

[Article: "Imam Khomeyni's Islamization Campaign stirs Hostile Reaction"]

[Text] This Friday morning, 4 July, processions from six districts of Tehran began to converge on the university where the big "demonstration of support for the Imam's decisions" is to take place. In groups no larger than a few hundred people brandishing portraits of the Imam Khomeyni and shouting the slogan "God save you, Khomeyni! Death to your enemy," the demonstrators, including many women in chador, were headed for the campus where the "Friday sermon" was to be given by Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei.

On the initiative of Ayatollah Hossein Montazeri, Imam Khomeyni's probable successor, many movements, religious leagues, committees and administrations had called on Wednesday for this show of support for the Islamization preached by the "Guide of the Revolution." In a communique published this Friday, 4 July, Ayatollah Montazeri denounced the "superpowers and their local agents" who might take advantage of this large gathering "to make accusations against any persons or institutions," and asked the participants to oppose such acts.

On Thursday the first signs of discontent had appeared in the center of Tehran against the radical islamization measures planned by the Iranian authorities. A demonstration of some 100 women took place in the morning before the residence of the president of the republic in order to protest the compulsory wearing of chador in offices.

The women intended to call for a new demonstration Saturday before the presidential mansion. They would be dressed in black and covered with scarves "which they will take off and tear to pieces" in order to protest compulsory wearing of it.

These still timid signs of resistance to Islamization--which Imam Khomeyni wants implemented "by 7 July"--are the first since March 1979.

A large march had in fact been organized for this date to protest a speech by Imam Khomeyni who for the first time had raised the question of compulsory wearing of the Islamic veil, but the Imam had subsequently moderated his plan.

For their part, the ministers are continuing to publish communiques in which they insist, like the minister of the plan, on the necessity of women "dressing in loose dresses, wearing nontransparent stockings and covering their heads with scarves." As for the minister of health, he called for nurses to cover their hair and part of their faces."

The minister of the interior, however, called for the security forces to prevent any aggression "by counterrevolutionaries" against unveiled women.

As for Ayatollah Khomeini, he declared that "while foreseeing discontent on the part of the international mass media...the Islamic Republic turned its nose up at governments dependent on Zionism or imperialism because it is determined to make the Islamic regulations respected, whether the wearing of the veil, the obligation to pray or the necessity of purges in the administration."

Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, confirmed on Thursday that a considerable number of Soviet diplomats will have to leave Iran. We have been "extremely nice" to the USSR, he said, in permitting one of its diplomats, First Secretary Vladimir Golovanov, recently expelled, to leave Iran freely although he had indulged in espionage activities. The minister felt that the Soviet diplomatic personnel in Iran is much too numerous compared to the Iranian personnel in the USSR. The staffs should be similar in size. Ghotbzadeh insisted.

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RABBI'S WIDOW INTERCEDES FOR IRANIAN JEWS

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Francis Cornu--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] Jerusalem--While Iran, since the revolution, has declared itself at war with Israel, and while Iranians, whether Jews or not, have been imprisoned or executed as */"agents of Zionism"/*, an Israeli woman has gone to Tehran several times in the last few months. With complete impunity. She even claims to have met with President Bani-Sadr and to have maintained excellent relations with a number of Iranian leaders.

An Israeli woman? Yes, for Mrs Ruth Blau lives in Jerusalem. But she repudiates this identity, and this is one of the secrets of her travels. On the door of her house this inscription is worth any amount of explanation: */"Jewish, but not Zionist."/* Mrs Blau* is the widow of Rabbi Abraham Blau, spiritual leader of the Netourei Karta sect, Guardians of the City, ultra-orthodox religious Jews, who have distinguished themselves by being opposed to creation of the state of Israel. Since [its creation], they have never ceased battling its institutions, because according to them the reestablishment of the independence of the Jewish people can only be the work of the Messiah. The Guardians of the City extend their challenge to the "impious" state so far as to pursue a dialog with the Palestinian organizations, an activity which sometimes gets them into difficulties with the Israeli secret services.

Convinced that Zionism is responsible for the misunderstanding between Jews and Muslims, Mrs Blau decides, when the revolution in Iran explodes, to seek an interview with Imam Khomeyni, who is still at Neauphle-le-Chateau. She seeks reassurance that the Iranian Jewish community will have nothing to fear from a change of regime. Today, she tells of this encounter as follows, an encounter the reality of which has been challenged in Israel, Mrs Balu's adventures there often being received with

* She is the author of a book, "The Guardians of the City," published by Flammarion (LE MONDE of 30 March 1979).

skepticism: /"Speaking to me with a certain warmth--insofar as he is capable of it--the Imam told me that the Jews would enjoy the same rights as all Iranians and that they would receive the same protections as the other religious minorities."/

One year later, disappointed to learn that these promises have not been honored, Mrs Blau takes advantage of the contacts she had made in France in the Imam's entourage to try to intercede on behalf of the Jews being hauled up before the Islamic tribunals. Using her Belgian and French passports she goes to Tehran in February, then in April, then in May, attempting in particular to obtain a reconsideration of the trial of Albert Danielpour, a Jewish businessman accused, among other things, of espionage for Israel. Her efforts are in vain, as is the intervention of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky: on 5 June, Albert Danielpour is executed.

Mrs Blau returns yet again to Tehran at the end of June: /"I wanted to know what had happened,"/ she says. /"In fact, it is anarchy. The entire hierarchy is short-circuited. The worthless and irresponsible religious leaders have taken power. It is terrible."/ She continues to defend President Bani-Sadr and Imam Khomeini, insisting: /"That imbecile Carter, by his bumbling, has undermined the authority that Bani-Sadr, an honest man, might have had. As for Khomeini, he is overtaken by events and, besides, very isolated. But I still believe he was sincere."/

In her peregrinations Mrs Blau has enjoyed the support of the PLO representatives in Tehran, who occupy the former quarters of the Israeli delegation, which was a virtual embassy under the Shah's reign. /"These Palestinians have given me all their support,"/ confides Mrs Blau. Her enthusiasm for them knows no bounds: /"They are very nice people...very religious. One of them even interrupted our conversation to perform his prayers."/ Dismissing the provocative character of her words to Israelis, Mrs Blau adds: /"Despite everything, the Israelis and Palestinians have proved to me, if there were any need of it, that Jews and Muslims can live together."/ Despite her criticism, she cannot hide her admiration for the manifestation of "faith" of the Iranian people. /"What an event! For the first time, an entire nation has risen proclaiming 'Allah ou akbar' (God is great)."/ Which is one way for this one-worlder to show her contempt for the sacrilegious and secular Jews of Israel. Mrs Blau is intransigent, to the point that in Jerusalem she refuses to use Israeli bank-notes bearing the images of David Ben Gurion or Theodore Herzl, the historic Zionist leaders.

ISRAEL

INTERNAL SOCIAL PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22 Jun 80 p 21

[Article by 'Umar Salamah: "Israeli Society; Peace Is an Issue, the Question Is 'How?'"]

[Text] In addition to its traditional crises and conflicts, Israeli society is currently experiencing new complications in its situation.

While the fundamental conflict experienced by Israeli society from the beginning has been the incompatibility between the eastern Jews (the Sephardis) and the western Jews (the Ashkenazis), there are many other conflicts which have cut across and still cut across this military society to make everyday life in it more difficult and tense.

The world economic crisis has affected the delicate Israeli economy and given it one of the highest inflation rates in the world, particularly since 1977-1978 when the economic crisis began escalating rapidly--as it continues to do--without the Israeli Government being able to produce any useful solutions to remedy the situation.

In 1979, the inflation rate passed the 100-percent mark, and from 1977 until the present the Israeli pound has lost around 80 percent of its value relative to the American dollar and around 95 percent of its value relative to SDR's. Israel's balance of payments deficit is nearly \$5 billion. In addition, there has been a forced rise in the unemployment rate and a drop in the Israeli citizen's purchasing power unprecedented since 1948.

The thing which has the greatest impact on the life of the ordinary citizen of Israel, however, is the military climate which dominates the country continuously. The Israeli society is first and foremost a military society and is based on constant readiness for war. With compulsory military service, the allocation of incredible budgets for the army, the constant fear of terrorist operations and the ubiquitous military presence, the Israeli citizen feels like he is living in a huge barracks.

While the Israeli regime has been able to justify this tense climate for a long time, the Israeli legislator has for some years witnessed the formation of new movements expressing the desire to abandon the dream of a "greater Israel" in exchange for the attainment of peace with the Arabs. The importance of this desire, which may appear peripheral to the foreign observer, lies in the fact that it is shared by a large percentage of the population, such that it has gained significant weight in the political movements among the various powerholders.

However, the most serious crisis that Israel is undergoing remains the slow pace of immigration into the country and the growing number of Jews who are leaving Israel officially. Although official Israeli statistics do not accurately reflect the true state of this crisis, they do provide a clear indication of this phenomenon, which is growing year by year and is disturbing the ordinary citizen and the government alike inasmuch as it delays the essential part of the Zionist plan, which requires newcomers so that Israel can expand.

Despite the fact that the Israeli Government still places the establishment of new settlements among its foremost concerns, this issue is no longer receiving the kind of support from the Israeli legislator that it has in the past. In fact, many voices have been raised demanding that the exorbitant sums allocated for settlements be rechanneled toward helping ease the severity of the economic crisis.

The failure of the Camp David talks to arrive at a solution to the problem of the lands occupied in 1967 has dashed the hopes of those Israelis who imagined that "peace" would solve their problems. Following a period of enthusiasm that lasted more than 2 years, the Israelis "discovered" that Sadat's initiative was a limited move, and that there can be no peace without the Palestinians, and that the conditions which their government insists on do not contribute to solving the problem.

While the subject of war was once the dominant theme, the subject of peace has become the most important issue today in the estimation of the Israeli politicians, who have begun to outbid one another in this area since peace is the perennial basis of their election campaigns, and rightfully so.

The intransigence of Begin and his party in the Camp David talks will be one of the main factors in his defeat in coming elections--that is, if the situation in the area does not explode. Observers are in agreement that the opposing Labor Party presently enjoys a big lead among public opinion.

But will the return of the Labor Party to power solve anything in the crisis of Israeli society? No, because even though the Labor Party opposes Begin's policies, it will not be able to solve the problem of the West Bank and Gaza, especially since its conception of a solution to the area's crisis does not offer anything more than Begin's in practical terms.

While the Israeli economy continues its downward spiral, the dissatisfaction of the ordinary Israeli citizen at the climate of war that [words omitted] continues to grow. For there can be no solution without a change in the present situation, which, despite outward appearances, works to the disadvantage of the Zionist state. There is a new Israeli-born generation which grew up with secure life as their main concern. A majority of this generation is not preoccupied by ambitions to build a big expansionist state.

In short, Israeli society lives today under a climate of fear that everything will get worse, fear of economic collapse, fear of increased emigration from Israel, fear of growing resistance on the part of the Palestinians within the country, fear of the international political isolation that the Jewish state is experiencing, and fear of the international political reversals that are accelerating so rapidly that they may one day eliminate the justification for American support of Israel.

Under fear of the worst and of an outbreak of war, the Israelis are waiting for something--a miracle that will reveal some light at the end of this dark tunnel.

As for the extremist Jewish zealots who establish settlements by force and with the support of the government in the lands occupied in 1967, they are waiting for something else: revolution.

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ISRAEL

MILITARY PLANS, BALANCE WITH ARABS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 22 Jun 80 pp 20-21

[Article by Tawfiq Nakhlah Ibrahim: "Israel's Latest Plan; A Repetition of 1948 Domestically and 1967 Regionally"]

[Text] Current developments involving the events in the West Bank and the Egyptian-Israeli talks have given a free hand to Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, who today possesses greater freedom of action than ever before.

Begin isolated? Begin tied down? This is the impression that the Israeli opposition and numerous sides in the Middle East and the West are creating.

In reality, however, Prime Minister Begin finally has a chance to pursue his personal convictions to the greatest possible extent.

When Begin came to power, the search for peace at "any price" appeared to be the official doctrine of the Israeli Government. But in fact, Begin has not been enthusiastic about playing the role of "dove" with presidents Anwar Sadat and Jimmy Carter. Egypt's concessions and America's pressures forced him into playing this part, which is so out of keeping with his past and his beliefs. Begin, the defender of greater Israel, was forced to agree to the return of a part of the occupied lands. Begin, who is totally convinced that Sinai constitutes the wall essential for Israel's security, was forced to sign agreements calling for complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. And what is "worse," as far as Begin is concerned, is the fact that he was forced to accept the principle of "autonomy" for the West Bank and Gaza while believing that these lands, which he calls "Judea" and "Samaria," must ultimately come under Israeli authority. Subsequent events indicated that he did not attach any meaning at all to the word "autonomy."

On account of all this, Begin has been criticized even within his own party, although he has tried on many occasions to conceal the fact that he has been forced to take these initiatives.

Today, it would appear that events have afforded Begin an opportunity to return to his true beliefs and his true personality.

Begin's two rivals inside his government, Dayan and Weizman, have departed. Weizman, who believed that his departure would weaken Menachem Begin--which has been true on the international level--actually left Begin with freedom of action. In addition, he unintentionally granted Begin complete control over the Israeli Defense Ministry.

Now Begin has begun to apply his own policy, which serves the aims of his Likud party. Domestically, he wants a repeat of the "strike" of 1948 and a forced exodus of the greater part of the West Bank Palestinians to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. He believes that this could lead to embarrassment of the authorities in Israel's neighboring states as well as permitting Israel to annex--without resistance from within--the agriculturally rich West Bank lands, which in Begin's view form an inseparable part of the historical land of Israel.

Washington's Continued Bias

This was the basis of the policy of senselessly suppressing the relations that had been established--skillfully and patiently--with influential Palestinian personalities in the West Bank and Gaza by both Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman. Begin was preceded in the implementation of this scheme by the terrorists of Rabbi Kahana and the supporters of agriculture minister Ariel Sharon. Sharon is so strongly "moderate" that Begin said of him that he might resort to massing tanks in front of the Knesset if the portfolio of minister of defense were not entrusted to him.

However, this policy is leading to increased Israeli isolation in the international sphere. In particular, it annoyed the Americans to such an extent that they agreed to allow the mayors of Hebron and Halhul, Fahd al-Qawasamah and Muhammad Mulhim, to travel in the United States.

Today Washington has a second unconditional ally in the Middle East, namely Egypt.

This is what the United States has been working toward since the early 1950's. And this is what makes it feel today that it is not compelled to support the Israeli Government in all areas. Up until a fairly short time ago, Israel was the only extension of the West in the Middle East, and its borders marked the end of Western influence in the area and the beginning of Soviet influence--or at least the beginning of hostility to the West as a whole.

From this distinctive position, Israel extended its power. Without a doubt, this is what Begin wishes to achieve again.

He especially wants to succeed in "realigning" Washington toward Tel Aviv and restoring complete harmony between the two capitals. However, the Israeli prime minister does not exhibit any desire to make new concessions demanded of him by Jimmy Carter. The weak personality of the American president, the active role of American Jews--who curbed the criticisms

aimed at Begin--and Carter's fear that others might block his reelection next November are all factors which work to give Menachem Begin free rein, Jimmy Carter will remain tied down at least until 14 August, the starting date for the Democratic convention which will confirm Carter's nomination as the Democratic Party candidate. Therefore, Carter is not in a position to sustain additional political losses, but must seize every opportunity to widen his popularity.

The Good Opportunity

The fact is that the Israeli prime minister has never had as good an opportunity to win over American public opinion, which is exhibiting evident displeasure with Israel.

The opportunity is also good for something else, namely a fourth Israeli-Arab war. Such a war could be the number one means for Begin to achieve his new strategic aim: to become once more the only "spoiled child" of Washington, which will allow him to make use of everything it has or controls and forgive him if he destroys it.

If a wide-scale confrontation does break out between the Arabs and Israel, Moscow might openly declare its total condemnation of the "Zionist enemy," criticizing "Israeli aggression" and viewing it as "imperialist American aggression." Since the Soviet Union does not want to miss any opportunity to refurbish its reputation in the Middle East, it might raise the stakes verbally and militarily. Some do not hesitate to say that Moscow intends to reclaim the mission of "opposing imperialism" by intervening directly this time in support of the Syrians. Faced with a clear initiative of this sort, it is not unlikely that Jimmy Carter, whose capital has been severely depleted by the Iranian and Afghanistan affairs, would resort to throwing his weight behind the Israelis. He would be aided in such a move by the mobilization of American public opinion in support of Israel through the American information media, while another Arab-Israeli confrontation is Begin's best hope for the creation of national unity around his government.

Military Factors

To these political considerations can be added what would appear to be decisive military factors.

Looking first at Israel, none of the Israeli officials hide their uneasiness in the face of the serious military buildup in Syria and Iraq. This buildup extends not only to equipment but also to the training of specialized personnel--e.g., pilots, radar technicians and missile technicians--which has advanced considerably beyond the 1973 level.

Iraq, the most important military power in the Gulf, today possesses a land army consisting of more than 200,000 troops, four armored brigades, and 2,100 tanks (mostly T-62's and T-72's), and an air force built around 725 fighters and patrol aircraft.

As for Syria, the figure of 3,000 tanks recently disclosed by President Hafiz Assad is enough to raise many fears in Israel.

The balance of forces between Israel and the Arab states during the time of the October war was 1 to 4, as opposed to 1 to 3 in 1967. In the latter part of this year, the balance ratio will reach 1 to 5. The fire power possessed by the armies of the eastern front (Syria, Iraq and Jordan) is now greater than that at the disposal of all the frontline NATO states combined: 500,000 troops, over 5,500 tanks and a minimum of 900 fighter aircraft.

The Israeli air force, on the other hand, is more vulnerable than in the past, inspite of the two new military bases which are to be set up in the Negev during 1981 and the fact that the number of fighters (500) now owned by the Israeli air force is three times what it was in 1967.

A few months ago, Gen Rafael Eytan made the following statement:

"I expect at any moment to receive a message informing me that the Iraqis are advancing toward Golan, the Syrians are on the move in the north and the Jordanians in the east."

Israeli military leaders, particularly Gen Avigdor (Ben-zvi), the commander of the northern front who opposed the Syrian offensive in 1972, dread seeing the balance of forces shifting in this way in favor of the Arabs, since an Arab military initiative could lead to penetration of the Israeli defense lines in view of Israel's restricted land area. All the officials in the present Israeli Army who experienced the shock of the Ramadan war want to avoid at any cost the reoccurrence of such a surprise.

Strike at the Syrian Force

With the continued failure to bring the Syrians to the negotiating table in the presence of the Egyptians, the argument of those who support a military operation (the hawkish camp) against the Syrian and possibly the Iraqi military forces is growing stronger.

If one takes into consideration the psychological state of Israel's current military leaders, such as Eytan and (Zvi Almog) of the navy commandoes, one cannot rule out the possibility of a military operation to strike at the Syrian air force supported by a naval operation aimed at destroying the ports of Tartus and Latakia along with the greatest possible number of warehouses.

With more than 3,000 armored vehicles and some 550 modern combat systems, the Israelis have the means to confront all military options, although the success of their plans is no longer absolutely assured.

To begin with, there is the pretext or excuse. This can be contrived on the occasion of a reprisal operation in south Lebanon following a Palestinian operation in Israel. During this operation, the Israeli force provokes the Syrian Army, applying Ben Gurion's military theory: Avoid at any cost fighting on our land and attempt to force the enemy to do battle on his territory. The goal of an offensive against Syria would be to destroy as much of its military equipment as possible.

Military experts expect that an offensive of this sort would have to take two directions. A strong armored force (most Israeli tanks are protected by magnetic antiprojectile and antimissile devices) would enter al-Biqā' from south Lebanon and encircle Jabal al-Safyāh. To the rear of this force would be a paratroop force and a force of armored vehicles whose objective would be to control Sidon and Sur following an intense air bombing of the Palestinian bases and camps.

There is another military option which Palestinian circles have pointed to for some time. Israel could conduct a large-scale military operation against Lebanese territory in an action aimed at driving the fedayeen toward al-Biqā' and pushing them toward Syria.

This operation could possibly coincide with another operation aimed at reaching the shores of Beirut by sea, which could result in a confrontation with the Lebanese Army. The objectives of such an operation would include a military strike against the PLO, on the one hand, and an attempt to strip the PLO of any political and moral prestige which affect conditions in the West Bank and Gaza.

If Israel does carry out either of these operations, it will not be based on overall strategic considerations but rather on a near suicidal action on the part of Begin. For even if the balance of forces might permit Israel to carry out large-scale military operations, it will not permit it to profit from its gains over the long term. In the political sphere, relations with Egypt would be dealt a blow, whatever the outcome of the conflict, and Israel's last remaining friendships abroad would be shaken. In addition, the Soviets would be able to offer extremely effective support to their old allies and win new allies.

As a consequence, the greatest loss from any Israeli venture would be its American ally, and thus it will certainly attempt to prevent the disaster Begin is preparing. The more difficult problem, however, stems from the fact that the American President is going through a stage which is leaving him more and more paralyzed at the same time that Begin is entering the stage for which he has dreamed for some time--namely, a stage when he will be given free rein to carry out his suppressed ambitions.

POLL TAKEN ON GOVERNMENT OF AL-HUSS

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 10 Jun 80 p 4

[Report on poll taken regarding the government of al-Huss: "Forty-six Percent Support It; 40 Percent Oppose It; 59 Percent Consider al-Huss a New Phenomenon in Government; 65 Percent See His Government as a Traditional Cabinet"]

[Cont.] In a poll that included 137 samples representing different Lebanese sectors, 46 percent were in favor of the government of Prime Minister al-Huss, 40 percent opposed it and 14 percent gave no opinion. Furthermore, 59 percent of the respondents considered al-Huss a technocrat who represents a new phenomenon in government, 47 percent said that he is innovative and 65 percent said that his government is traditional.

All the above and more were the results of a quick poll taken by the research and study department of DAR AL-SAYYAD before al-Huss submitted his government's resignation. The poll included various districts of Beirut and represented the following groups:

Students	-- 34 (25 percent)
Teachers	-- 13 (9.5 percent)
Employees	-- 41 (30 percent)
Merchants and craftsmen	-- 13 (9.5 percent)
Doctors and engineers	-- 13 (9.5 percent)
Other groups	-- 23 (17 percent)

The poll included four major parts: The first part was intended to know the general basic attitude toward al-Huss and his government. This was dealt with in 6 questions. The second part was related to the attitude toward the government of al-Huss in terms of success and/or failure. This was dealt with in three questions. The third part was more detailed as it was intended to learn, in detail, the reasons for support or opposition, by answering four questions. The fourth part discussed a replacement for al-Huss by asking the direct question: Whom would you choose as a new prime minister? The results are summarized in four separate tables.

It is obvious from the first table that the more general the question is, the less undecided and hesitant people are. The percentage of [undecided and hesitant people] was 2.4 percent for the first question, but it was 12 percent for the fourth question. This may lead to an important conclusion which is that al-Huss is basically and naturally accepted. This is supported by the fact that 49 percent of the respondents were undecided on the question of whether to classify al-Huss's government as a success or a failure, despite the fact that there were 46 percent for and 40 percent against the government.

The distribution of votes of those in favor of Prime Minister al-Huss (in the second question) was as follows:

Students	-- 14.6 percent
Teachers	-- 1.5 percent
Employees	-- 12 percent
Merchants and craftsmen	-- 3 percent
Doctors and engineers	-- 3 percent
Other groups	-- 11 percent

The opposition among these groups was distributed as follows:

Students	-- 7.3 percent
Teachers	-- 8 percent
Employees	-- 13 percent
Merchants and craftsmen	-- 5 percent
Doctors and engineers	-- 3.6 percent
Other groups	-- 3 percent

The above means that Prime Minister al-Huss got the highest percentage of students in favor of his government and the highest percentage of teachers opposed to his government. Employees had equal percentages of acceptance and opposition.

In looking at Table 2, we notice that the government of al-Huss succeeded, in the respondents' opinions, in the areas of salaries, administrative action, security and harmony. But it was considered a failure in the same areas by other respondents. This shows how difficult matters are and how difficult it is to define responsibility in matters of destiny.

Those who considered the government of al-Huss a failure gave the sensitivity and complexity of the situation, party considerations and the overall political system as the main reasons. There were also 10.5 percent who thought that lack of taking chances contributed to his failure.

We must point out that the sample this poll is based on is not as small as some may think. Polling organizations in the biggest nations rarely use more than one or two thousand respondents. The sample, and not the number, is the key.

on the other hand, we must point out that the results of this poll are not definite. Polls usually reflect opinion trends more than definite facts.

We, therefore, publish these results with the usual reservation, presenting to the readers the complete results shown in the four attached tables.

Table No. 1 (First Six Questions) Attitude toward the Government of al-Huss on the Basis of General Support of Opposition in Concrete Numbers (and percentages of total respondents in parentheses)

1. Prime Minister al-Huss is described as a technocrat and political outsider. Do you think this quality was in his favor?										
2. Do you consider yourself a supporter of the government of al-Huss?										
3. Do you believe al-Huss offered something different?										
4. Do you grant al-Huss your vote of confidence?										
5. Based on its practice, do you consider the government of al-Huss traditional or innovative?										
6. How do you evaluate the government of al-Huss in general? Is it a success or a failure?										
Question No.	Position	Total	Students	Teachers	Employees	Merchants & Proprietors	Doctors & Engineers	Other		
		137 (100)	34 (35)	13 (9.5)	41 (30)	13 (9.5)	13 (9.5)	23 (17)		
1	Yes	81 (59)	20	4	22	7	8	15		
	No	53 (38.5)	14	4	19	3	5	8		
	No answer	3 (2.3)	--	--	--	3	--	--		
2	Yes	63 (46)	20	2	18	4	4	15		
	No	55 (40)	10	11	18	7	5	4		
	No answer	19 (14)	4	--	5	2	4	2		
3	Yes	64 (47)	14	7	16	7	5	15		
	No	60 (44)	20	6	17	3	8	6		
	No answer	13 (9)	--	--	8	3	--	2		
4	Yes	67 (49)	14	3	22	5	4	19		
	No	53 (29)	12	8	19	3	7	4		
	No answer	17 (12)	8	2	--	5	2	--		
5	Yes	89 (65)	22	8	31	4	9	15		
	No	45 (33)	12	5	10	6	4	8		
	In between	3 (2)	--	--	--	3	--	--		
6	Yes	41 (30)	4	5	20	3	5	--		
	No	29 (21)	16	2	3	1	3	--		
	In between	67 (49)	14	6	18	9	5	15		

Table No 2 (Questions 7-9) Attitude Toward the Government of al-Huss on the Basis of Detailed Areas of Success or Failure

Question No	Field	Total Points	Students	Teachers	Employees	Merchants & Proprietors	Doctors & Engineers	Other Groups
7	Security	265 (100)	10	6	15	5	7	11
	Salaries	56 (21)	26	11	26	4	10	11
	Admin Action	69 (26)	15	12	24	7	7	4
	Harmony	44 (17)	10	9	16	-	7	2
8	Security	271 (100)						
	Harmony	73 (27)	24	7	21	5	2	14
	High Cost of Living	81 (30)	24	1	28	3	6	19
	All	87 (32)	16	9	28	3	9	21
9		30 (11)	3	7	10	7	3	-
		299 (100)						
	Partisanship	65 (22)	20	10	17	3	5	10
	Delicate Situation	73 (24.5)	25	7	23	3	5	10
	Lack of Initiative	26 (8.5)	--	6	7	11	-	2
	Political Complexity of Situation	5 (2)	--	-	-	3	2	--
	Lack of Support	71 (24)	11	9	21	7	8	15
	Political System	2 (0.5)	--	-	-	-	-	2
	Lack of Boldness	24 (8)	9	-	6	2	1	6
		33 (10.5)	10	3	17	-	3	--

Note: The total of the 6 groups is more than 137. This is due to the fact that each respondent gave more than one area of success or failure of the government of al-Huss. Therefore, we considered that the total is that of points and not of the number of people. As a result, percentages are related to the total points accumulated from each question.

Table No 3 (Questions 10-13) Attitude Toward the Government of al-Huss on the Basis of Detailed Reasons for Support or Opposition

Question No	Reason	Total Points	Students	Teachers	Employees	Merchants		
						Doctors	Pro-prietors	Other Groups
		192 (100)						
10	Support for being the best government	52 (27)	20	9	14	2	2	5
	Support for being a patriotic man	20 (10.5)	9	-	--	1	1	9
	Oppose for overall failure	12 (6)	--	3	--	1	3	5
	Oppose for failure to provide security	108 (56.5)	32	11	30	7	10	18
		239 (100)						
11	Is not different	10 (4)	2	--	--	3	-	5
	Is different being a businessman	85 (35.5)	24	9	34	4	8	6
	Is different because he is honest	33 (14)	--	7	14	4	6	2
	Is different because he is educated	111 (46.5)	34	12	34	6	10	14
		30 (100)						
12	Specialized	14 (47.5)	4	2	4	-	2	2
	Parliamentary	8 (26.5)	3	3	-	-	-	2
	Harmonious	8 (26.5)	4	-	-	1	1	-

[Table 3 continued]

Table 3 (continued)

Question No.	Reason	Total Points	Students	Teachers	Employees	Merchants & Professionals		
						Pro-prietors	English	Other Groups
13	Education	471 (100)						
	Tardiness	115 (24.5)	32	13	30	9	11	25
	Faces facts bravely	61 (13)	16	10	24	5	3	3
	Impartiality	66 (14)	24	7	26	6	8	5
	Integrity	37 (8)	10	5	13	-	7	7
	Hesitation	36 (8)	7	--	15	-	4	10
	A man fit for government	86 (18)	22	13	32	2	7	10
	Deep thinking	25 (5)	3	5	12	-	3	2
	Lack of accomplishment	10 (2)	7	--	--	-	1	--
	Perception of consequences	15 (3)	3	3	3	-	3	2
		20 (4.5)	10	3	4	-	2	1

Note: The total of the 6 groups is more than 137. This is due to the fact that each respondent gave more than one area of success or failure of the government of al-Huss. Therefore, we considered that the total is that of points and not of the number of people. As a result, percentages are related to the total points accumulated from each question.

Table No 4 (Question 14) Replacement Government and Prime Ministers (First and Second Choice)

14. Whom would you choose as a replacement for Prime Minister al-Huss?

Question No	Replacement	Total Points	Students	Teachers	Employees	Pro-prietors	Doctors	Engi-neers	Other Groups
		77 (100)							
14	al-Huss	20 (26)	4	4	8	2	1	1	1
First	Sa'ib Salam	16 (21)	1	3	2	-	8	2	2
Choice	Amin al-Hafiz	35 (45.5)	10	8	2	-	7	8	8
	Rashid Karami	1 (1)	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
	Taki al-din al-Sulh	4 (5)	-	1	2	-	-	-	-
	Usamah Fakhuri	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
		94 (100)							
Second	Amin al-Hafiz	2 (2)	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Choice	Sa'ib Salam	2 (2)	-	1	-	1	-	-	-
	Sa'ib Jarudi	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
	Taki al-din al-Sulh	11 (11)	4	-	6	1	-	-	-
	Muhammad Zakariyya 'Itani	1 (1)	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
	Raymond Iddah	1 (1)	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
	Sulayman al-'Alfi	76 (82)	22	7	15	-	12	11	11

Note: The total of the 6 groups is more than 137. This is due to the fact that each respondent gave more than one area of success or failure of the government of al-Huss. Therefore, we considered that the total is that of points and not of the number of people. As a result, percentages are related to the total points accumulated from each question.

NATURE OF RIFT BETWEEN PRESIDENT, PREMIER EXPLORED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 19-25 May 80 pp 10, 11

/Article by Rafiq Shalala: "Divorce Has Broken up the Good Marriage between Ba'abda and the Palace"/

/Text/ The dispute between President Sarkis and Premier al-Huss has come out into the open, and talk is still circulating about a new premier, as are efforts to cure the rift.

Political observers in Beirut are agreed in describing the relationship between President Ilyas Sarkis and Premier Dr Salim al-Huss as passing through a difficult stage these days, and they agree that the difference in viewpoints between the two chiefs began to emerge from secrecy after the media and politicians' clubs had bruited about news of the difference between the "two friends" over the decree organizing the army.

This difference was repeated, but remained hidden, whenever the government wanted to resolve the question of the army, whether on the promotion of officers or the outlines of the new structure of the organization, which Lebanese look upon as the life preserver which will save them from the disension which is almost breaking up their country.

Perhaps what causes political observers to talk about the expanding rift in the dispute between the two chiefs is the position the prime minister took in the parliamentary discussion session and repeated on other occasions concerning the issue of the reorganization of the army, when he declared that there is a difference in views within the government regarding the status of the Intelligence Department in the army and the entity to which it must be subordinate, as well as regarding the powers of the commander and the chief of staff and other details.

Observers considered that al-Huss's "sudden" position--perhaps his hasty one--on this type of sensitive issue had the effect of giving those damaged by the establishment and the unity of the army the chance to strike at it

and make the prime minister's statement the object of an auction in the street which great and small will snatch at in order to state an opinion or express an observation.

The observers' fear was appropriate, because positions opposed to the government view and positions contradictory to them began quickly to appear, here and there, until the issue of the army became a flea market in which the bearers of slogans "vied" with the "bidders" from all groups. As a result, discussion of the issue of the army was paralyzed, question marks were raised on its role, conflicting voices on the Lebanese stage cried out and every leader pitched in his bucket and presented his opinions.

The Destiny of the Dispute

Sources close to the government say that President Sarkis found fault with Premier al-Huss' position and that a climate of loathing dominated them. The premier refrained from going up to the Presidential Palace except to attend Council of Ministers meetings or major occasions, and the bilateral working meetings which had been going on between the two parties were suspended, although many developments had occurred which made it mandatory that the two chiefs consult with one another during this period. Conversely, the messengers of good works were active in repairing the severed connection between Ba'abda and al-Dawhah, proceeding from the premise that it was necessary to maintain strong relations between the two chiefs lest the issue of the army be a matter which added tension to their relations whenever it was raised for discussion, going by previous experience.

The question which is being raised among Lebanese political circles now is where the dispute between the two chiefs will lead, will a divorce between them occur, and will the country be on the verge of a crisis of government or a new cabinet.

In order to respond to this question, it is necessary to review the stages through which relations between Sarkis and al-Huss have passed. These stages appeared as follows:

When President Sarkis was governor of the Bank of Lebanon, he came to know a chaste, self-deprecating, urbane, sage man named Salim al-Huss who was his colleague as chairman of the committee supervising the banks, acting in coordination with the bank governor so that the two of them could preserve the stability of the Lebanese economy, the banking sector and the Lebanese pound. Although his position was independent of the governor, Salim al-Huss did not discuss or act on important matters without the agreement of the bank governor, which gave President Sarkis the feeling that Salim al-Huss the Sunnite could be a colleague in the government of Ilyas Sarkis, the Maronite, as he had been in the Central Bank.

When Salim al-Huss was chosen premier in the early part of this era, President Sarkis had close Sunnite friends. Among them were people who had

pursued politics, such as Premier Taqi-al-Din Sulh and people who had been working in the administrative or military fields such as Staff Maj Gen Ahmad al-Hajj (now director general of the Domestic Security Forces). In spite of that, President Sarkis preferred to have his "chaste, sincere" colleague in work participate with him in the government and in the job of saving the wounded nation.

People close to the president say that he was sure that Salim al-Huss was not a politician who might fall under the influence of the street but that he was a person who could rise above factional feelings, and that it would be possible to adopt a single decision through the agreement of both--an agreement which would be reflected in the institutions of the government which had suffered from schism and collapse because of the detritus left by the two years' war and the fragmentation afflicting the government and its institutions.

The two chiefs set forth with a conspicuous harmony in the first months of their rule; the government received the agreement of the Chamber of Deputies on the issuance of the legislative decrees (which have the force of laws) passed by the agreement of the two chiefs. In the beginning of April 1977 the first jolts began to appear in united stands and relations. The first fruits of the contrasting stands were over the officers of the "Army of Arab Lebanon" and the need to dismiss them from service to facilitate the reconstruction of the army. At that time, modifications were presented and Premier al-Huss refused to agree to them out of fear of reactions to them in Islamic circles. A real opportunity to reconstruct the military organization was lost, especially since the leaders were behind any step the government took on behalf of uniting the country.

The dismissal of the officers stopped and question marks began to go about secretly in President Sarkis' heart, although he did not disclose them even among his closest confidantes.

The country went through grave events in 1978, the most important of which perhaps was the shelling to which the eastern section of Beirut was exposed. At that time, it was said that the prime minister was not taking a position consonant with that of President Sarkis, but in fact that he embarrassed him by some of the statements he made on the legitimacy of the "deterrence" and what he called the "transgressions" of armed people in the eastern area.

The cries rose up against Premier al-Huss among the leaders of the "Lebanese Front", but President Sarkis continued to cooperate with his friend--in fact covered him on numerous occasions. The regime resumed progressing on a parallel course for some months, until the discussion of the new defense law came up in the Chamber of Deputies. At that point relations were disrupted again over the principle of balance within the army and its role and guidelines.

People close to the government state that at that time Premier al-Huss adopted positions which were contrary to President Sarkis' and responded to those who were trying to raise the principle of balance as if it were a complex. Nonetheless, those confidantes add, the president "suffered" embarrassment and agreed to the modified law as approved by the Chamber of Deputies and issued in the official gazette. By this step, the president had hoped that the reservations of those who had had reservations would cease and that any excuses on their part regarding the army's assumption of security missions in the country would vanish. At that time the president was gambling that al-Huss would greet Ba'abda's responsiveness by really facilitating the task of the army and that he would put pressure on the group he represented in the government and his allies to pave the way for more and more domestic security within the country.

However, the premier did not do this. Rather, to the contrary, he continued, in direct or indirect ways, deliberately or not, to cast doubts on the army's role sometimes by stating that it was still in the construction stage and needed time and sometimes by describing the tasks it had carried out in al-Ashrafiyah following the withdrawal of the Saudis as tasks "which entailed stumbling blocks." Sarkis was disturbed by his premier's hesitation at that time: he had been hoping to receive a response from him in exchange for the concessions he had offered which had made him the subject of grievous criticism on the part of leaders of the "Lebanese Front."

The Promotion Crisis

No sooner had relations begun to resume their course than the rift appeared once more in 1979, when the issue of the promotion of a number of officers in the army was raised. At that time Premier al-Huss objected to the promotion of "symbols of war" and refused to sign the decree, which proceeded to go back and forth between al-Dawah, Ba'abda and al-Yarzah time and again. This time, also, President Sarkis hoped that Premier al-Huss would respond to him, because he had agreed to the promotion of all officers who were legally entitled, including those who were considered symbols of war because in the president's conception they had been defending Lebanon on orders from the legitimate power at the time, bearing no burden of any errors which could be attributed to political realities or current security considerations. The president's hope lay in the fact that Premier al-Huss had formed a new cabinet which was expected to be the prelude to reconciliation and would reduce all difficulties in the way of the attainment of this popular demand. Then the equations of al-Huss' positions were presented again and struck the same "sensitive cord."

al-Huss "triumphed" and the promotion decree was paralyzed. It remains so, in spite of the efforts which people close to the president have exerted to transcend this "rupture." However, the tension resumed when the powers of the Intelligence Department and the decree organizing the army were discussed, especially since both chiefs had differing views. The two chiefs

tried to conceal the secret of the permanent tension in their relations, which appeared only when military matters were discussed, but the recent position of Premier al-Huss and his open declaration of a dispute in the Chamber of Deputies caused the situation to explode. It put President Sarkis in a difficult position which, going by sources close to him, reached the point of censure, blame and anger.

People who know President Sarkis state that he is very patient and endures a great deal but that he was not expecting that his friend Premier al-Huss would reciprocate with such distressing stands, as it was he who had brought him into the world of politics and caused him to enter the club of prime ministers, putting aside all the other politicians to most of whom he was linked by firm personal relations.

al-Huss' Reasons

Why, however, has al-Huss taken such positions?

Some circles close to President Sarkis say that Salim al-Huss is a "humane" man but is surrounded by advisors who implicate him in specific positions under the veil of factional balance, so that he becomes the captive of these positions and contradictions appear between him and President Sarkis, who, on many issues, has abandoned the complex of representing a specific faction and has looked at the interests of the country as a whole. He, that is, President Sarkis, wants al-Huss to put factional hatreds to the side and act from purely national premises.

However, Premier al-Huss' circles reply negatively about the advisors' role and, reviewing the justification for al-Huss' position, wonder: Isn't the prime minister entitled for example to meet with the president to discuss important matters without having a specific minister, between whom and the premier specific mutual sensitivities exist, being in attendance?

In this context, these circles refer to the meetings which were held only in the presence of the minister in question, which created an enduring complex in al-Huss. The same sources state that this is one of many examples and that the president has not striven to reduce this minister's role, because he has strong confidence in him.

However, in the opinion of some benevolent intermediaries who have recently been actively smoothing out the atmosphere between the two chiefs, Premier al-Huss stands alongside President Sarkis in major difficulties and on crucial issues.

These intermediaries give as an example of this al-Huss' stand during the Tunis summit (a stand which irritated some Arabs and some political parties in Beirut) and his position on filling the security vacuum which almost arose after Syria had hinted at withdrawing its forces from Lebanon. At

that Qasbi al-Huss agreed to assign the army to preserve the security and fill all vacuums. Similarly, there are other examples which show al-Huss' responsiveness to Sarkis on basic, crucial issues.

However, these intermediaries acknowledge that Salim al-Huss sometimes takes positions in which there is some obstinacy, especially concerning delicate matters or in matters related to the construction of the army, especially since the current delicate circumstances the country is passing through make it obligatory to establish a cohesive army in which factional shocks will not have an effect which will be supported by a strong intelligence, enjoying absolute powers, able to move among five local and Arab intelligence agencies, not to mention the intelligence services of the parties and organizations which move about powerfully on the Lebanese stage with powers unhindered by overseer or supervisor. In this regard one should bear in mind that government intelligence is supposed to be the strongest and most effective of the intelligence forces, to say nothing of the fact that the new defense law has created new rules on the activity of the military organization, facilitating the process of overseeing its conduct and errors which might arise which could be contained by political decisions which will as a consequence have the determining say.

Government sources say that President Sarkis insists on his position as far as the role and tasks of intelligence go in the coming stage. In his position, he proceeds from the premise of international support for the need to establish the army and assign it new security tasks rather than having it stay in the barracks as a prisoner of politicians' positions. Conversely, last week the prime minister began a counterattack to explain his point of view on this issue indirectly.

A New Premier?

This fact leads to a question: have relations between the two chiefs reached the point of a divorce? Have the divorce "proceedings" officially started? Has preparation for a new premier started?

Some intimates who are trying to "cook something up" say that the divorce has occurred and that preparation of a replacement has started. They raise some names in the political marketplace which are possible and some which are destined for the fire. This subject, in the political sense, means that the object of anger is being banished or that the object of satisfaction is being brought in by preparing the climate for that. Among the names which some intimates are raising are those of Premier Rashid Karami, who visited Ba'abda a few weeks ago and left to make a statement before television cameras which was more like a ministerial statement, and Premier Taqi-al-Din Sulh, who is not against returning to the palace, as he is the one who has stated, in front of intimates and journalists, that he will be the most likely to succeed in setting out on the road to reconciliation, in view of what he represents "through the family," or politically.

However, other intimates say that the worst relations between President Sarkis and Premier al-Huss would be better than the best relations between Sarkis and an alternate premier, especially in these circumstances, in light of the realities the country is going through, and in light of the currents which would exert pressure on any premier.

Premier al-Huss says "Don't ask me to give more than I am able, so that I can continue to be useful in my environment; otherwise, that will be harmful to the government and the president and will be devoid of effectiveness."

President Sarkis is dealing with the matter calmly and with patience. He knows that the time for a divorce has not yet come, especially now that slogans have been set forth and lines have been sketched out in the new army law which the future premier will not be able to ignore. He knows that these slogans have been set out in order to function as a prison for the new premier which will tie him down at the start of the journey and will pose a problem between him and the president in the first steps of the new government. This is on top of the fact that cooking up a government of reconciliation has not yet become clear and there is no justification for speed, haste, or leaping into the unknown.

Will patience and calm lead relations between the two chiefs to return to the way they were in the days of the Central Bank, or will patience be waiting for relief through the door of national reconciliation, and will the divorce then be final, without fear of reactions, because the reconciliation, the government of reconciliation, and the premier of reconciliation will be able to transcend the obstacles now existing?

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EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE SOUGHT FOR SOLUTION TO CRISIS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DI'WALI in Arabic 19-25 May 80 pp 12, 14

/Article by Bisharah al-Bun: "Butrus' European Movements: Clearing the Air for a Solution, Not Reaching One"/

/Text/ The vessel of Lebanese diplomacy, whose captain put it to sea from Bastras Palace on a private trip or on official trips to come, did not set sail at a time or choose a direction which was accidental.

To the contrary, the fact that the direction of its course turned west to the shores of Europe occurred after hope had been lost, or had been suspended for a time at least, of shores which are close by and far away at the same time--shores which, although they might have admitted the vessel to their ports at times in the past, have not given it the true, serious attention it deserves.

Lebanon, the patient, has brought its disease, rising above its wounds, and turned to the people closest to it on more than one occasion and in more than one place and time, asking them for help not in diagnosing the ailment and prescribing the remedy but in providing the climate for a cure. Were its people able to do so without interference and were they given free rein, without custodianship, they would be able to overcome the disease in spite of their problems and contradictions.

This Lebanon has been surprised by a disability, not to say serious injury, from the family it was supposed to assert that it belonged to and from the fact that the family has stood as an observer, and even a provocateur, and a defender before Lebanon's wounds, setting its eyes on one concern, namely sending the "contagion" away from its door.

In spite of this bitter experience, this Lebanon has not lost hope. Rather, it has continued to try knocking on the doors of people far away, realizing that whatever is far from one's sight is far from one's heart at the same time. And more--it has realized that those who consider themselves the citadel of democracy and the protector and defender of human rights are the countries most prepared, in fact most receptive, to sacrifice any

democracy and disregard the destruction of the rights of any people, if that facilitates the solution of a greater crisis and at the same time preserves its more important direct interests, if even at the expense of a country and at the sacrifice of a people.

Therefore, Lebanon's chastisement of the United States, as diplomatic sources see it, is more than just a matter of finding fault with it for adopting a specific stand on a specific issue. Rather, it involves a deeper, more comprehensive, more distant issue, which is "its failure to commit itself to Lebanon's survival and its permanent readiness to sacrifice that if that will make it easy for it to deal with other issues and allow it to maintain its interests with its allies."

Between the disability of the "Arab close at hand," and the abandonment of the "faraway American," Lebanon found itself abandoned, tossed about by the waves, buffeted by winds which were hot at times and cold at other times, from the north at times and from the south at other times, finding itself faced only with Europe standing in the middle of the route. Thus the intermittent tour along the European road came about.

Has this Lebanese movement toward Europe come about by chance? What does Beirut expect from London or Paris, or even from the European family as a whole, at a time when united, serious Arab decisions are lacking and American determination is missing or at least in abeyance?

These among others are questions which will be raised in the direct European contacts which the Lebanese foreign minister, Mr Pu'ad Butrus, began in London, will follow up on in Athens (next June), and will complete in Paris and Vienna (next July).

The Choice of Timing

What there is no doubt about is that the Lebanese movement was preceded by preparations for some time, but the timing was chosen specially, following the increased talk about European readiness to carry out if not an initiative in the true sense then a movement aimed not at reaching a comprehensive solution but, as diplomatic circles have defined it, "attaining specific developments in solving the crisis in a just manner." Since the date for proceeding to embark on open steps along this road drew nigh as 27 May approached, as French diplomatic sources hinted, Lebanon considered that it was its duty to move by using its friendship and traditional relations to mention its cause and prompt the Europeans to "devote to Lebanon and its cause the attention it needs in the course of their efforts to arrive at any development which will deal with a solution to the crisis in the region, since the Lebanese situation cannot be absent from any proper solution to the crisis."

However, continuing along the European road does not, in the view of Lebanese officials mean that Europe can take the pot out of the well and take the place of the United States. Experience has proved--and Camp David has provided the clear example--that any plan or effort taken in the absence of either of the great powers and removing that power from participation in it cannot, according to these sources, ultimately lead to anything but failure. By isolating the Soviet Union, the United States committed a great error which it has now become difficult to make up.

Thus Lebanese diplomacy considers that it is premature to talk about a European initiative in the real sense and that all the situation entails is that "an idea is enticing the European family as it is now seriously studying it inside itself and with the Palestinians specifically."

The Alternate Card

In order to be "acceptable and to yield results which can be guaranteed in advance," the "alternate card" which Europe wants to play after 26 May to save the situation must, according to diplomatic sources, provide conditions, of which the most important are:

First, that in its promulgation it not constitute a kind of challenge to the American failure.

Second, that any declaration of agreement among members of the family, especially France, Britain and West Germany, must precede the contents of the card, provided that the timing of the declaration be chosen later so that the conditions for success will be present and guaranteed and the chance of failure slight.

It appears, on the one hand, that the situation within the group, despite some formal differences, is united and unified from the standpoint of conception, essence and goal. On the other hand, the same sources consider that no practical movement can yield fruit until after the American elections. Anything which precedes them can only calm the atmosphere and lay out the preparatory framework for the desired settlement.

There is a conviction, over which the British and Lebanese parties agreed during the meeting between Minister Butrus and his colleague Lord Carrington, that this kind of anticipated European movement will have to face problems, the least of which are the delicate Arab and international circumstances, especially the current American political atmosphere and the rigid American position resulting from the approaching date for the American elections, of which the primary results in the state of New York were only a warning and an indication. Thus the conviction that it is necessary to be committed to "deliberateness" in order to guarantee the soundness of the movement.

What form, however, will the anticipated European initiative adopt?

An official source in the British Foreign Office pointed out to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI that "the European orientation, among the notions which it is believed will constitute an entree, is aimed at some settlement. At the outset that will result in a new resolution which will be issued by the Security Council and will help expand the context of Resolution 242 via a guaranteed party, provided that consideration be given in a clear manner to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the establishment of their state."

The source added, "The British role will not be isolated from the united European effort, this time, starting with today, it will, rather, be more effective in terms of movement, especially after the British government finishes dealing with the Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) problem and will be fully free to deal with other international issues, at the forefront of which lies the Middle East issue."

The source did not rule out the possibility that Lord Carrington would in the future make an Arab tour which might include Lebanon in the course of this movement.

The Southern Plank

However, if Lebanon's official effort is being concentrated these days in significant fashion on inviting friends, principally the Europeans, to help provide a minimum immunity to the patient, namely Lebanon, which will guarantee that it will continue to survive and exist while waiting until it attains the full convalescence it must receive, is the diagnosis of the disease on the part of the family of the patient the same? Is there agreement on the diagnosis domestically before the outside world is asked to help provide some of the elements in this prescription, in the event it is not made available locally, or to eliminate some of the difficulties in its way?

This and other questions have intentionally been raised by diplomatic circles in order to remind the Lebanese, who are the family of the patient, that no foreign doctor can take their place, that they are more aware of the disease than others, consequently that no one "can scratch their skin the way their own nails can," and that the people abroad cannot take the place of those at home--that indeed the most that is in their power to do is help them eliminate the obstacles to the implementation process, on the condition that agreement be reached on the method which must be followed.

But how is this patient today?

Although Lebanon has been smitten with some limited internal blows which had hardly ended before the pains and hurts of the Lebanese reopened, causing them partial paralysis, the permanent, continuous hemorrhage in

its southern flank is more grievous, deeper and more dangerous because of its dimensions and its repercussions on the state of the nation as a whole.

The British party's view was clear in this respect. He considered that there will be no permanent stability in Lebanon as a whole as long as the situation in the south remains as it is and that peace in Lebanon can proceed only through a settlement in southern Lebanon. The British government is convinced that the establishment of serious cooperation among the international forces, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the legitimate Lebanese forces could put a limit to the disturbance prevailing in this area of Lebanon, without ignoring the Israeli role in this region.

While treating this southern wound constitutes an urgent necessity, the continued hemorrhaging there could be the prelude to the final dispatch of the entire body which, in spite of the severity of the miscellaneous wounds which have brought partial paralysis to some portions of it, has understood how to remain standing as a homogeneous organic unit and has warded off the danger of total paralysis, if total death has not been spared it.

While one of the most conspicuous direct results of Arab disability is the Arabs' lack of desire to put their fingers on the wound, contenting themselves with circling around it, one thing Lebanon fears most intensely today--and many people domestically and abroad share this fear with it--is that the international forces' task will be made to fail and the problem of a security vacuum will be created which will strengthen the existing situation, and this bears the seeds of dangers threatening the Lebanese entity as a whole.

The danger whose impact and results are the most intense is what some people have called the settlement. A great deal of talk has taken place on this in recent days. Government sources refuse to apply this term and go farther than this, considering that actual facts show that the situation is more extensive than that, that is, that there is a quasi-Palestinian state in Lebanon in which authority is exercised not just over Palestinians but also over some Lebanese as well. These sources state that they have warned, and are warning, that if this situation continues as it is, even if it is temporary and tentative in the opinion of some people, that will entail dangers which will afflict the Lebanese and Palestinian causes at the same time.

While some of them call upon the government to resolve its situation in the south by deterring Maj Sa'd Haddad, its response is to stress that Haddad is its enemy just as Israel is its enemy and that one must not ask 5,000 Lebanese soldiers to do what thousands of Arab soldiers have been incapable of doing. If anyone has found deterrent forces in the transfer of the international forces, it is official Lebanon alone. Except for that, everyone hopes for the opposite and hopes that the mutinous situation

will remain as it is. In addition, determination of the international forces' working zone, and turning that into an area of peace is the only way to eliminate Israel's excuse for continuing its aggression, whose repercussions go beyond the border strip and its surroundings.

The Domestic Reconciliation and the Outer World

While the Lebanese patient has been destined to bear its sufferings in anticipation of some relief through the cure of the overall disease of the area, are there ways to alleviate these sufferings and prepare the patient's body to embark on its activity as soon as it receives a curative dosage?

In other words, will the reconciliation which must precede the return of normal life to Lebanon continue at the present time to be just a slogan, or is there hope that it will move from words to deeds?

Government sources, in spite of their conviction that a Lebanese desire for mutual understanding exists, consider that the disputes which still are driving Lebanese apart find people to fuel them from abroad. Therefore, they call for people not to wait for a "magic solution" to the problems facing Lebanon. However, they do consider that there are opportunities to alleviate the sufferings of this sick body but that these can come about only through reconciliation, which can be followed by a government of reconciliation--which would assume the guise of a true translation of the principles of reconciliation--and that no serious change in government can take place except in this context.

Among these possibilities, which are closer to theoretical concepts than practical reality, is the occurrence of political interactions in the region which will lead to new changes in the circumstances of some countries bordering on Lebanon. What is meant here is Jordan, which is more ripe for this than others. In a talk with the newspaper AL-NAHAR, Dean Raymond Iddan previously clearly pointed out for the first time, about a year ago, that the terrain for the coming series of conspiracies and the developments which could arise from them, bringing repercussions on the overall situation in the area--as well as the resulting international maneuvers it will witness--could be Jordan.

The second possibility is the occurrence of European activity on reasonable, acceptable bases as part of steps which are aimed at moving the situation in the area.

The third possibility, which is closer to theory and more remote from reality, is for the Arabs to resolve their situation and decide to remedy their affairs and Lebanon's problems with a new spirit, being truthful with themselves and their peoples and frank and bold with Lebanon and the resistance.

In the context of discussion over the possibility of alleviating the climate in Lebanon and moving some of its problems, which are solidly connected to the nature of Lebanese-Syrian relations, government sources have considered that the recent visit to Beirut by Syrian minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam constituted an important evolution in the course of these relations, as it created an atmosphere of mutual relaxation and relief.

This visit, while not addressing itself to the nature of solutions, as equations which were propounded--because that would need time and a specific framework--did facilitate agreement over the means for dealing with matters which had been in suspense and the spirit with which they should be taken up. Therefore, misunderstandings and differences disappeared to a large degree and the Lebanese party sensed a full readiness in the Syrians' part to make it easy to reach the goals which had been set forth and promise to help overcome difficulties and eliminate barriers.

However, according to the same sources, these visits, to yield fruit, must be accompanied and followed by the attainment of a minimum of Lebanese understanding and agreement on the Lebanese demands--not just on the part of Syria and the Arabs but also on the part of Europe. Every friendly country is anxious that Lebanon retain its unique form and its special situation in the middle of this area of the world.

There remains the fact that the orientation of Lebanese diplomacy, which represents the line of the legitimate central authorities in the current stage, is to protect the Lebanese identity from damage, to stress that life remains in the sick body of Lebanon, not to do away with its spirit, and to provide it with a minimum of immunity in order to stretch out the dynamite fuse which extends from it, while awaiting a radical curative remedy for the malady of the region as a whole.

11887

CSO: 4802

TWO CHRISTIAN FACTIONS SEEK END TO QUARREL

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI : Arabic 19-25 May 80 pp 14, 17

/Article by Mayy Kahhalah: "End of the Cockfight between the Phalange and the Liberals"/

/Text/ For about 5 months, bloody episodes have been taking place between the fighting men of two groups--the "Lebanese Front" and the Phalange, and the Liberal Nationalists. These led to increased tension in the atmosphere, while the bridges of dialogue were being extended between the staff of the "Lebanese Front," the Syrians, and the Palestinians, with the objective of reaching a comprehensive agreement over the formula on which Lebanon must now concentrate in the quasi-truce it is experiencing now.

The cause of the dispute between the Phalange and the Liberals, which does not go beyond antagonisms between small party officials in distributing areas of influence, almost brought the two parties into an open fight.

Looking back, one can observe that President Camille Chamoun, head of the Liberal Nationalists' Party, did not agree to the statement by his son Danny, defense secretary in the party, or the accusations which he heaped upon the Phalange, to the effect that its acts were "fascistic" and that "party security was a failure because it was biased." At that time President Chamoun tried to persuade his son not to "break the jug" with the Phalange in the atmosphere of optimism which indicated that a reconciliation with the adversaries was close at hand. Why was the alliance with the strong party in the front broken and the people's confidence shaken?

Sources close to Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, commander of the "United Lebanese Forces," say that he decided not to reply and contented himself with registering a stand which the Phalange has often repeated, that is, that "there are conspirators in the ranks of the Liberals" and that the squabbles between the two parties would end up to the advantage of those who say that it is necessary that the parties hand their weapons over to the government because they are unable to guarantee the peace. These sources also said that al-Jumayyil was not against giving the government an opportunity to impose its influence but that he stipulated that that

take place in all areas, not just the Eastern Province where the army is present in token form. Bashir al-Jumayyil was anxious to be moderate in his reaction to the Liberals' statements, because, in his view, "Lebanon is passing through a critical crisis and the parties to the 'Lebanese Front' must not be diverted from it by peripheral matters which occur because of an absence of discipline among certain elements which are the clients of either party."

The Charge of a "Single Party"

However, how can one interpret the conduct of Mr Danny Chamoun, whom some people have described as "necessary and important" and others as "impetuous?"

It appears that Chamoun was living in fear that the Phalange would act with severity and decisiveness in dealing with any dispute which might arise with the Liberals. The proof is what happened previously in 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Jubayl, and before that in Juniyah and some villages of Kasrawan, where the Phalangists relied on force to "deter" Liberal elements of whose good will they were complaining. This fear grew, with time, to the point where it became widely stated among all Liberals that the Phalange Party was trying to take decisions in isolation and dominate all activities in the Eastern Province, Kasrawan and Jubayl.

In the most recent period, Bashir al-Jumayyil was careful repeatedly to deny the charge against him and the Phalange of striving for a "single party," and he held intensified meetings with President Chamoun to prove to him that his intention was actually to coordinate with everyone without preconditions on the part of any group.

Proceeding from that premise, Chamoun relied on issuing a "war order" to his son Danny to stop the statements on the security incidents with the Phalange, especially as regards al-Safra on the Futuh coast of Kasrawan. Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayvil then called upon his son Dashir and Danny Chamoun to a "private soul searching" from which the two emerged smiling, indicating the elimination of sensitivities through their statements. Danny said that he was "Shaykh Pierre's son" and that he was ready to discuss anything obstructing total and actual agreement between them with Bashir in depth.

After that, successive meetings occurred to put an actual limit on the antagonism and to support reconciliation, to the point where the "Lebanese Forces" commanders--usually restricted to the "military men" of the front--called for a meeting attended by "Politicians" of the two parties characterized who were by a moderate nature, such as the lawyer Karim Baqraduni, the sponsor of the reconciliation between the Phalange and Syria, Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, who is anxious to deal with matters diplomatically and politically, through persuasion, the lawyer Charles Ghastayn and Eng Marun Hilw, of the Liberals, who are in charge of education and internal affairs

in it, and Mr Cyril Bastras, "governor of the common treasury," who is responsible for all the "front's" funds.

Agreement To Agree

At this mixed meeting, perhaps for the first time, frank talk dominated the situation and agreement was reached that "everyone would reach agreement."

Before talking about the reconciliation, it is necessary to say that the negative results, which observers noted, after all the disputes between the Phalange and the Liberals, have been so serious that they have removed them from the "conspiracy" going on against Lebanon and against the Palestinians in the region. While the two parties kept settling trivial disputes, Israel was exiling major officials from the West Bank to Beirut, planning to expand its military operations and bring its troops down onto the coast from al-Damur to Sur. Naturally, the international Security Council contented itself with condemning this Israeli act, but the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations on autonomy were suspended and a spontaneous semi-revolution broke out on the West Bank rejecting Zionist settlement in the Arab areas.

These events in the area are directly and negatively on Lebanon reflected because they will lead directly to the settlement of Palestinians in the south in spite of opposition from all groups in Lebanon, in the face of blatant Arab impotence toward it.

In this context of anxiety, it was necessary that the "Lebanese Front" insist on closing the ranks of its fighting men and return them to the former concord. For this reason it was left to the four-man committee which emerged from the "historic" meeting, which was assigned to set out a new structure for the "Lebanese forces" in the framework of transforming the "front" into a political organization comprising groups which are considered "right wing" in the broad sense of the word, to work out the "field" details of the reconciliation.

Similarly, a regional committee was formed in Kasrawan, with two representatives of the "Lebanese Monastic Order" among its members, to receive complaints and present reports to the leaders of the Phalange and the Liberals. Here it is necessary to refer to the Lebanese Monastic Orders' effective role as an intermediary between the two parties. It has hastened at all times to receive kidnapped persons, put a stop to the deterioration of conditions, and get in contact with everyone to prevent an aggravation of the disputes, which would lead to a weakening and fragmentation of the "Lebanese forces" in such delicate, critical circumstances.

At the reconciliation sessions, secret or open, the monks have repeated on more than one occasion that the practical solution is to punish people who violate party orders, that the punishment should be carried out in the

open so that it will be an example to the rest, that it is necessary that the four-man commission resort to that, and that its detailed program must be "diagnosing the remedy" which will be rapid and effective to those whom every group describes as "engineers in sabotaging the unity of Lebanese ranks." For example, every violator will be stripped of party protection and he will be placed at the disposal of the "Lebanese forces" in order to determine the punishment he deserves, and this will be boldly proclaimed without fear of the loss of elements who have become habituated to illegal activity and conceal themselves in the framework of the war on the excuse that they are fighting and ready to die when need requires.

Elements of this kind previously caused disputes between the Phalange and the Liberals at 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Furn al-Shabbak which nearly turned into a real slaughter after a large number of people were killed. At that time, the two parties strove to issue a statement of unification within a "national party" headed by President Camille Chamoun and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. This was in mid-May 1979. However, this declaration remained mere ink on paper because the dispute ended with the arrival of the army in the area. This event prompted people to ask for the army whenever they believed that a rift in the alliance between the two parties had become imminent, and therein lay real embarrassment for both.

11887

CSO: 4802

FIRM SELLS TECHNOLOGY WITH TERRORIST APPLICATION POTENTIAL

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Jul 80 pp 94-95

[Text] Swedish firms supply Libyan dictator Qadhafi with technical know-how and devices for terror attacks on Israel.

Shortly after 17.00 hours the sirens howl in Tel Aviv. Four Reshef speedboats, coming from all directions, are approaching a point 15 miles off the coast where Israeli radar has tracked suspicious objects.

Soon after the tourists sunning themselves on the beach hear the distant chatter of ships guns. In coastguard headquarters near Haifa reports come over the loudspeakers: "Two hits."

However, two more unmanned boats keep going toward the beach at Tel Aviv, crowded with thousands of holidaymakers. A few minutes later two powerful explosions rattle windows as far away as Ashgelon. Later that evening Israeli radio stations report 500 killed.

So far this is no more than a vision--the horrific vision of the use of a new terror weapon intended by Libya's chief of state Mu'amar Qadhafi to intimidate the arch enemy Israel: Chartered mother ships are to launch remote controlled speedboats loaded with dynamite. And if everything goes according to plan, Qadhafi will be able next year to send the first such boats into enemy waters.

The enterprise is unlikely to fail for technological reasons. The electronic remote control directing the infernal floating machine to its target has impeccable antecedents: It is supplied by the Telub electronic firm of south Swedish Vaxjo, a subsidiary of the state owned arms corporation Forenade Fabriksverken.

For the price of 12 million krona (DM5 million) Telub is supplying the Libyans with 50 radio controlled autopilots plus 6 radar installations for the mother ships.

Experts have no doubts whatever about the future use of the devices. Instructors at the Stockholm Military Academy explained to the large circulation newspaper *EXPRESSEN* that the devices were suitable in particular to direct unmanned vehicles, "loaded with explosives," to distant targets.

Telub chief Benkt Dahlberg feigns ignorance. He maintains that he has always thought "they want to adjust the engines with them." However, Dahlberg does admit that he "is no expert in these matters."

The boat bomb is also made in Sweden. The Libyans ordered 15 ships of the "Store 51" type from the Storebro Bruk boatyard in Vastervik on the Baltic and, in addition, purchased the license for constructing such boats themselves.

The Telub scandal is not confined to the supply of "hot" merchandise to Libya. Since March last Telub engineers have been instructing 100 Libyan officer cadets in computer, telecommunication, radar and rocket techniques. The price paid by Tripoli: 400 million krona.

Though copies of the curriculum, drafted by Telub, are already circulating among Swedish parliamentarians, Benkt Dahlberg seems unconcerned still: "Nobody can say for sure that these guys are not soldiers." In any case, the training "resembles that at Swedish high schools." Dahlberg rejects the claim that pistol practice is part of the curriculum: Target practice is entirely extra-curricular.

Per Ahlmark, Swedish vice premier 1976-1978, takes a very different view. He considers the Telub curriculum to represent the "training of terrorists." According to him it is "an ugly hypocrisy for Sweden to train Libyan soldiers while challenging other countries to disarm."

On the other hand the government of Prime Minister Falldin, which banned the sale of war toys in late 1979 to demonstrate its peaceful attitude, had Minister of Trade Staffan Burenstam Linder assert: "The term war materiel certainly does not apply to this equipment."

The Social Democratic opposition thinks much along the same lines. In 1974 party chief Olof Palme, then prime minister, himself laid the foundations of the delicate trade relations. On the occasion of his official visit to Sweden Qadhafi's deputy, 'Abd al-Salam Jallad, introduced by Palme as "my friend 'Abd al-Salam," promised that cooperation with Sweden would in future enjoy "priority" in Libya. The communique spoke only of paper, steel and lumber deliveries. Only later did the news leak out that Palme had promised his friend assistance in the matter of nuclear technology.

So far the Swedish arms industry has not been particularly bothered by the debate of the disruption of the Swedish nation's relation to its role as an international peacemaker. For the longest time the industry has happily supplied arms to sensitive regions, though usually by circuitous routes.

Telav boss Dahlberg is full of good cheer. He has not the slightest intention of letting his Libyan business be spoilt. As far as he is concerned Qadhdhafi is a democrat. Dahlberg is convinced that, if elections were held in Libya, "the Libyans would certainly vote for Qadhdhafi."

11698

CSO: 3103

LIBYA

BRIEFS

NEW TERRORIST AID--By way of reprisal for the expulsion of Libyan diplomats from London recently, Colonel Kadhafi has just provided new financial aid to the IRA extremists. (Text) (Paris LE POINT in French 4 Aug 80 p 28)

CSO: 4800

NATION'S FUTURE DEPENDS ON SOLUTION OF SAHARAN CONFLICT

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Jul 80 pp 25-26

[Article by Howard Schiesel]

[Excerpt] Since it won independence in November 1960, the 'Islamic Republic of Mauritania has tried to serve as a kind of a hyphen between Africa below the Sahara and the Maghrib, between "progressive" Africa and "moderate" Africa, all the while contributing to the development of bonds of solidarity between black Africa and the Arab world. An ambitious program, to be sure, for a young nation the survival of which as a national entity was threatened for a number of years. In fact, probably few countries have waged as arduous a diplomatic battle as Mauritania to win the place it deserved as a member of the international community, and still more important, to insure respect for its existence by more powerful neighbors.

The ethnic composition of the country to a large extent dictated the guiding principles of a diplomacy which stresses the double affiliation with Africa and the Arab world. Located at the junction of the Sahara and the Sahel, where two different but complementary civilizations meet, Mauritanian society has integrated the Arab-Berber culture of the Moorish nomads with that of the settled black African farmers. The desire of the regime to assert its multiple personality on the world scene has thus been closely linked, in the period which followed colonization, with the need to consolidate a still fragile national unity.

The rapid escalation of the Saharan conflict had disastrous consequences for this country, which was not prepared for war nor desirous of waging it. The failure to respect the United Nations Charter, which proclaims the right to self-determination, and the principles of the OAU, which guarantee respect for the frontiers established in colonial days, tarnished its image among the countries of the Third World. The military aid obtained from France and the strengthened political and military alliance with Morocco aggravated the situation. Neither the 10,000 Moroccan soldiers sent to Mauritanian territory nor the French air force prevented the raids from paralyzing mining operations, which were

essential moreover to the economic survival of the country. The cost of this desert war brought Mauritania to its knees and caused the old phantom of antagonism placing the two ethnic communities in conflict to reappear. The blacks felt that they were paying dear in a conflict which did not directly concern them, while the Moors showed no enthusiasm for combating POLISARIO front units often belonging to the same tribes as they.

Dynamics of Military Peace

Thus in 3 years of "sand warfare," the painful period which followed independence seemed to have been brought back. The national unity achieved at such pains was breaking down, and Morocco seemed to be achieving what it had been unable to impose by force in the past--disintegration of the Mauritanian institutions and expansion of its influence to all sectors of the nation.

Then came the military coup d'etat of July 1978, which put the dynamics of peace in motion. After more than a year of hesitation, complicating the intense struggle for power within the military committee, Mauritania finally signed a definitive peace treaty with the POLISARIO Front on 5 August 1979 in Algiers. It recognized the right of the people of the Western Sahara to self-determination, and renounced any claim on the Sahara. The government thus succeeded in getting the country free of the conflict without making new enemies. By putting an end to the presence of Moroccan troops on its territory and, after a 4 year interruption, reestablishing its relations with Algeria, Mauritania completed its diplomatic reorientation toward the main protagonists in the Saharan conflict. Seemingly confident of its capacity to defend its own frontiers, the government asked, in May of 1980, for the repatriation of the small contingent of French troops stationed in Nouadhibou since the end of the preceding year.

This 4-year participation in the Saharan imbroglio will doubtless appear in the future to have been a mere interlude in the relations between Mauritania and its neighbors. Mauritanian diplomacy is now seeking to reassert a traditionally nonaligned foreign policy. It is obvious, however, that for as long as the conflict in the Western Sahara has not been resolved, the future of that country will remain ambiguous. For the uncertainties born of this situation and the changes which may occur in the northwestern part of Africa will continue, in many respects, to dominate domestic political life and to condition the inevitable redefinition of relations with the entire region.

9157

CSO: 4400

SNIM'S OBJECTIVES DEPEND ON FACTORS OUTSIDE ITS CONTROL

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Jul 80 p 29

[Article by H.S.: "Iron Mines--40 Percent of the Gross National Product"]

[Text] "If we had had to begin at zero, the Guelb project would probably have still been in the testing stage. But as we enjoyed the benefits of long experience, an excellent reputation and faithful customers, there is no reason to think that we will not carry off our ambitious gamble." This statement was made by one of the leading officials of the SNIM [National Industrial and Mining Company], a state enterprise, at a time when Mauritania is preparing to undertake the second phase of exploitation of its iron ore reserves.

The mining industry was launched at the beginning of the 1960's with the rich Kedia d'Idjil deposit, where the ore content varied between 65 and 70 percent, under the sponsorship of a European trust, the MIFERMA (Iron-Mining Company of Mauritania).^{*} The development of the Mauritanian deposits discovered since the middle of the 1930's was closely linked with the redeployment of the European metallurgical industry after World War II. The European producers sought in fact to substitute new, cheap sources located within their zones of influence for operations becoming less profitable in their home countries. Mauritania, which is near the European market, offered an ideal location from this point of view.

The substantial investments necessary to put extraction into operation and for transportation facilities and the introduction of capitalist business into the life of our country had radically altered its traditional economy, almost exclusively concentrated previously on nomadic, autarkic activities and subsistence farming. Among the other innovations brought in by the emergence of the mining sector were the generalization

^{*} The main stockholders in MIFERMA were Rothschild-Metal (11.4 percent), the French state, through the Geological and Mining Exploration Office (BRGM) (24 percent), Denain-Usinor (14.4 percent), British Steel Company (19 percent), FINSIDER of Italy (Iron and Steel Finance Corp) (15 percent), German steel interests (5 percent), and, finally, the Mauritanian state (3 percent).

of a monetary economy and a creation of an embryo of a workers class.

The three deposits in Tazadit, Rouessa and F'derick went into production in the 1960's. Extraction progressed rapidly and exports reached almost 10 million tons in 1970. Although very minor in terms of international criteria, mining exploitation gradually became the spinal column of the economy. However, and paradoxical though it may seem, this sector was both essential and marginal to the economic life of the country.

It was essential in the sense that it came to represent more or less 80 percent of the total export income and 40 percent of the gross national product, and accounted for a quarter of the wages paid out in the modern sector. It was marginal in that less than a third of the income to which it gave rise remained in fact in the country. With only five percent participation in the MIFERMA, the government did not have great weight in the making of major decisions, such as, for example, the rate of exploitation and the choice of technologies. The MIFERMA became an enclave in Mauritania, a real state within a state. The rapid exhaustion of the reserves without the development of new industrial or agricultural activities to sustain the economy once extraction was finished represented a still more disturbing prospect in the long run.

The nationalization of the MIFERMA in 1974 marked the active stage of the effort made by the state to exercise greater control over economic life. But at the same time, a series of unexpected international and regional events served to hinder the mining industry and placed the future of the country as an exporter in this field in serious danger. First of all, the economic crisis affecting the main European clients continued to deteriorate, limiting demand. Exports collapsed: From 11.6 million tons in 1974--the record year--the figure fell to 8.4 million tons in 1977 and 6.4 million tons in 1978. Parallel with this, the price of ore continued to drop in real terms on the international market, making the situation still more critical.

The War in the Western Sahara

On the regional level, the intensification of the war in the Western Sahara dealt a harsh blow to the new state enterprise, the National Industrial and Mining Company. The 650-kilometer railroad line linking Zouerate with the port of Nouadhibou, which was particularly vulnerable, became one of the favorite targets of the POLISARIO guerrilla units. In 1977 alone, for example, 170 convoys were destroyed, involving the loss of more than 18 percent of the annual ore exports, while very costly damage inflicted on the installations only aggravated the situation.

Such disturbances of its activities faced the SNIM with a serious dilemma. It had to guarantee not only regular exports, but also the launching of the Guelb project in order to sustain extraction at least

until the end of the century. Since the first sites would be exhausted by 1987 or 1988, it was necessary, in fact, to close the gap to put new sites into exploitation by the beginning of the 1980's. The area around Zouerate contained seams with reserves estimated at more than 2 billion tons. Thus two guelbs--the name given to the rocky outcroppings containing the ore characterizing the region, the kedia, for its part, being a chain--El Rhein and Oum Arwagan were chosen. But since the ore content of these guelbs was about 37 percent, it was necessary to plan for the massive investments necessary for its enrichment.

The cost of the first phase of the Guelb project is estimated at 500 million dollars. Such a sum obviously exceeded the financial capacity of Mauritania. In January of 1978, the World Bank and a number of other financing sources, both Western and Arab, agreed to allocate about 360 million dollars in loans at low interest rates,* if the SNIM would contribute, for its part, 100 million. In order to place the enterprise in a better position, it was decided to abandon certain unprofitable operations such as the extraction of copper at Akjoujt, and to reduce personnel by 10 percent. In addition, in order to support the project, the government of former President Mokhtar Ould Daddah took a step backward in its nationalization plan. A law was passed to authorize Arab capital, public or private, to hold up to 49 percent of the capital in the SNIM.** In this way Mauritania became able to make its financial contribution to the new operation. Finally, the country staved off the sword of Damocles threatening its mining industry by putting an end to its direct participation in the Saharan war.

The entry of the guelbs into production, which is scheduled for 1983, will compensate for the slowdown at the old mines and will make possible an increase in exports, which should reach about 14 million tons a year by the end of the decade. Although the SNIM is in a position to achieve its goals, the final success of the undertaking depends on a number of factors which lie outside the control of Mauritania: the world demand for ore in the course of the coming years, sharp competition from cheap producers such as Brazil and Australia, and the uncertain value of the dollar, the reference currency for exports of iron ore. Moreover, to

* The main lenders are the World Bank (60 million dollars), Saudi Development Fund (65), Central Economic Cooperation Fund (50), Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (35), European Investment Bank (30), Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (20), Japanese Fund for Overseas Economic Cooperation (16), African Development Bank (12), and the OPEC Special Fund (5).

** Arab capital, public and private, finally underwrote 120 million dollars of the SNIM capital, representing 29 percent, as follows: Kuwait, 40 million dollars; Arab Mining Company, 28; Morocco, 20; Iraq, 22, and the Islamic Development Bank, 10.

reassure foreign investors and lenders, the government has had to accept draconian conditions for the use of income from ore. It must automatically be placed in foreign exchange accounts, through which the operational expenditures and the SNIM creditors will be paid. Only then can the remaining funds be transferred to the Central Bank of Mauritania.

For a number of years, the income from ore exports will thus be mainly allocated for the repayment of SNIM debts and the amortization of very expensive new equipment. Can such a small country as Mauritania break out of the vicious circle which dooms it, like other nations of the Third World, to supply the world market with raw materials in exchange for which it receives only a minimal part of the profits? Can production be maximized and the surplus reinvested in other productive sectors, so as to build a viable economic base for the "post-ore" stage? This is the challenge the country must meet in the course of the coming years.

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GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE FOOD PRODUCTION NOTED

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Jul 80 p 28

[Article by P. B.: "Agriculture--A Difficult Battle Against Thankless Nature"]

[Text] When one travels from Dakar to Nouakchott and flies low over the Senegal River, one cannot fail to be struck by the contrast seen between the two banks. One can clearly see where the tropical climate, where vegetation abounds, stops, and where the desert climate begins. There, even the right bank of the river seems less lush than the left bank, and as one moves toward the north, everything grows with increasing difficulty.

The figures fully confirm what leaps to the eye. One can even say they are more surprising still than the landscape. In fact, this country of 1,030,700 square kilometers has less than 200,000 arable hectares (109,000 dependent on rainfall, 40,000 watered thanks to dams and 48,000 along the river), on which in fact there is actually planted to millet and sorghum 70,000 hectares dependent on rainfall and 31,000 downstream of dams. In addition, there are 2,000 irrigated hectares planted to rice, with yields of 3.7 tons per hectare in contrast with those of 0.3 and 0.2 elsewhere. [Line or lines missing from the text here] millet and sorghum, and 750 hectares planted to corn. Some 250 hectares planted to truck garden crops are producing 2,000 tons (8 tons per hectare), and palm plantations also supply some vegetables and 12,000 tons of dates.

These statistics will suffice to show why the grain deficit will come to 75,000 tons in 1980 (80,000 tons last year), with consumption of 120,000 tons at a cost of a billion ouguiyas. Now the continuing dry spells over a dozen years have not helped matters. The conflict in the Western Sahara--from 1975 to the ouster of President Ould Daddah in 1978--did nothing but aggravate matters by accelerating the rural exodus. Nomads and rural residents, estimated at 85 percent of the population a decade ago, account for only 40 to 50 percent at the moment today. The proportion of nomads alone has dropped from 78 to 27 percent. As to the livestock, which has been decimated, the total, according to the Ministry of Rural Development, comes to 1.5 to 2 million cattle, 8 to 10 million sheep and goats, and 800,000 camels, although some experts believe these figures to be optimistic.

Under the old regime, the rural sector was often declared a priority, but nothing more, it seems. The Military Committee for National Safety decided in turn to reassert this option, and according to Minister of Rural Development Mohamed Ould Amar, this will in beginning to be implemented, particularly in terms of the volume of credit allocated to this sector in the austerity budget implemented by the Haidalla government. He has established three goals: 1) to achieve self-sufficiency in food; 2) to halt the rural exodus; and 3) to regenerate the natural environment.

The team in power has continued cooperation with Mali and Senegal within the framework of the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), which has undertaken to build two dams, one in the Diama delta, to prevent salt water from coming upstream (the foundation stone was laid in December 1979 and the cost is estimated at approximately 600 million francs), and the other, upstream, at Manantali, in Mali. The latter will have a 16 billion cubic meter reservoir, making it possible to control flooding at the beginning, and then to eliminate it once the necessary installations for the irrigation of some 400,000 hectares are completed. The dam will also supply 800 million kilowatt hours of electricity and make the river navigable from Saint-Louis to Kayes all year round. The project as a whole is scheduled over some 40 years, but the first phase should make it possible to develop about 500,000 hectares in just a few years.

Along with these imposing projects, a dozen lesser ones with more immediate yield are either planned or already underway. The most important is probably the development of the Gorgol Noir and the Gorgol Blanc. A dam on the first of these water courses, at Fom Gleita, should create an 11,000 hectare artificial lake irrigating 6,000 to 15,000 hectares, and another dam, on the second water course, at El Bir, will make it possible to irrigate 3,000 to 6,000 hectares thanks to an 8,000 hectare lake. Negotiations with the EEC, the World Bank, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi for the financing of the building of a dam and the development of 3,000 hectares should lead to the signing of a contract at the end of June.

Self-Sufficiency in Food

The project for the Aftout es Sahli depression between Nouakchott and the Senegal River is another which is relatively ambitious but difficult to carry out, because of the presence of veins of salt. The development of some 15,000 hectares, at an estimated 2 billion UM, will require 2 to 3 years and will be undertaken with the aid of Iraq, beginning in 1981. To expand rice cultivation, 1,000 out of 4,000 hectares are being developed in the Boghe plain, 700 in Kaedi and 1,400 in Rosso, with the Chinese taking charge of this latter project. Finally, Saudi Arabia will contribute to the financing of 3,000 hectares of rice fields and 4,000 hectares of various crops at Irkize Lake.

Nature is so unyielding that any effort designed to make it produce has side effects or a price. Therefore the authorities are awaiting the conclusion on the RAMS project, at the end of June, with interest. This is a study conducted by the Americans to assess the potential of the country as a whole in water and manpower. They have already begun drilling 36 deep wells to be added to the 10 already completed by the new regime. In addition, while the country had 80 dams, some of them small and superficial, the government commissioned 18 more in Hodh in December and started work on 14 others in Tagant.

The authorities also decided in favor of establishing 50 village districts in the south. They are inviting villages to join together and to pool communal land to enable the state to dig a canal, with the peasants for their part taking charge of the completion. Similarly, the state is expanding the Kaedi agricultural school so that in the next 18 months it can graduate 300 farm cadres, as compared to only 50 currently. The Institute for Research on Tropical Agronomy, for its part, notes that "a simple improvement of traditional cultivation techniques very generally makes it possible to double the grain yields without investment." It is necessary further to find the "popularizers" who will carry the results of this research to the peasants.

Finally, following a flour shortage in May, due to poor coordination on the part of the importers, the Mauritanian Grain Bureau, a state company, has taken charge of establishing regulatory and safety stocks. To this end it is building some 50 storage warehouses in all the regions.

The authorities are not unaware that they are waging a difficult battle, and the minister of rural development admits that self-sufficiency in food will not be achieved, in view of the lag in the work of the OMVS, until the year 2010 or 2015. Nor is he unaware that the technical measures will have but limited effects for so long as certain social problems have not been resolved, particularly those involving the free man and the land ownership system. However, the CMSN has taken the first step in this direction, entrusting a study of reform of the land-owning system to a national commission, in order to prevent those working the land from abandoning it because of the demands of their masters.

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DISSOLUTION OF BNED QUESTIONED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 12 Jul 80 pp 1, 4

[Article by M.M.: "Why the Dissolution of the BNED?"]

[Text] One wonders about the reasons for the decision of the Political Bureau of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] to dissolve the National Bureau of Destourian students. The answer may be in the new views which have been giving substance to the political life of the country for some time.

Actually, it is no more than a logical and consequent transition from word to action. Democracy, free elections, freedom of choice and will, and dialogue and search for credible and truly representative partners are mentioned. . . . Yet, the behavior remains consistent.

The dissolution of the BNED [National Bureau of Destourian Students] stems from the acknowledgment of a failure on the part of the Tunisian Youth Organizations Union, which has been recognized and, why not, mentioned:

"In effect, the former bureau was no longer representative and had lost all credibility among the students who reproach it for its behavior toward the organizations. Lacking the ability to project and promote a mobilizing program for action and, therefore, promoting the disagreement which marks relations among the members of the bureau, the latter had become incapable of renovating its own structures. It sentenced itself to inaction."

Why was it necessary to wait until matters reached that point? The answer, unquestionably, lies in the very nature of the new stage to be entered.

Crossing into the new stage, the raising of this question once again is an expression of a firm desire to democratize all party institutions. Logically, among others it has to undergo a radical revision of the structures of the institutions of Destourian students.

"Henceforth, the explanation goes, quantity is not necessary. Quality alone counts. There is neither need for applause nor for outside support. The party would be satisfied with a conscientious, active, and effective minority able to influence those around it. The Destourian institutions must give the example at all levels. How could one advise or blame others about anything if there is disorder within our own institutions?"

How to rebuild the BNED?

Let us immediately begin with establishing contacts with the Destourian students for the purpose of organizing seminars on the local scale, i.e., on the level of the delegations, to be followed by regional seminars.

In the light of the results of such seminars the democratic structures will be organized by the students themselves through free elections.

"The party, it is stipulated, is not ready in this sense to control mediocrity or support professional careerist students, or else tolerate underhand practices."

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TUNISIA

DEVELOPMENT PLANS EXAMINED AT CABINET SESSION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 27 Jun 80 p 4

[Article: "Third Decade of Development and the Sixth Plan on the Agenda: Head of State Presides Over Meeting of Council of Ministers")]

[Text] The Council of Ministers held its weekly meeting yesterday morning, Thursday, 26 June 1980, at the Government Palace in the Kasbah with the head of state presiding.

At the close of the deliberations Fouad M'hazaa, the minister of information and culture, made the following statement:

"The council has examined the work relating to the production of forecasts for the third decade of development and to the preparation of the Sixth Plan in the light of a communication of the minister of the Plan and Finance."

The timetable planned for the preparation of the next plan is divided into four phases.

First Phase

(April-September 1980) Preparation of the aggregate and sectorial retrospectives and of an orientation note on the third decade and the Sixth Plan.

Second Phase

(October 1980-January 1981) Preparation of overall content of the Sixth Plan and of sectorial forecasts.

Third Phase

(February-September 1981) Regional forecasts and elaboration of the penultimate version of the Sixth Plan.

Fourth Phase

(October 1981-July 1982) Elaboration of the definitive version of the Sixth Plan.

In addition, the council decided on the principal questions which will be the subject of studies with a view toward pursuing the work of economic and social development.

These questions have to do with the general environment, reforms, priorities and the first quantitative forecasts.

The questions relating to the general environment have to do with the definition of the role of the state, the contribution of the private sector and the place of the cooperative sector as well as with Tunisia's relations with the outside world.

Among the reforms to be introduced are those of the administration, education and training, taxation, finance, public enterprises, the statute on investments, social security and the channels of distribution.

The priorities include general and sectorial priorities. The general priorities concern employment, regional development, exports, industrial integration, pricing and revenues.

The sectorial priorities are agriculture, energy, the engineering industry, textiles and tourism.

Finally, the first quantitative forecasts concern employment, investments, the growth rate, the balance of payments and domestic and foreign financing.

The president of the republic laid emphasis on the necessity of pursuing the national efforts with respect to economic and social development and giving the key sectors the attention they deserve. The head of state also recommended completing the technical studies within the prescribed periods and seeing to it that the preparatory studies for the Sixth Plan are carried out under the best conditions.

In another connection, on motion of the minister of equipment and housing the council approved an important draft bill ratifying the loan agreement concluded between the Tunisian government and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). This loan, totaling 14.6 million dinars, is intended to finance a 3-year rehabilitation program for 800

kilometers of roads as well as the purchase of equipment and preparatory studies for a subsequent farm roads project.

Finally, by motion of the minister of public health, the council approved a draft bill ratifying an accord between the Tunisian government and the Association for Voluntary Sterilization on the establishment in Tunisia of this organization's regional office for the Middle East and Africa.

It should also be noted that President Bourguiba returned yesterday morning to the Government Palace in the Kasbah to preside over the Council of Ministers' weekly meeting.

On this occasion the citizens again showed their affection for the leader of the nation. In fact, the moment the presidential cortege arrived at the Place de la Kasbah cheers burst out for the head of state who, standing in his open car, responded to the crowd's cheers with gestures and smiles.

President Bourguiba was welcomed in front of the Government Palace by Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali; Habib Bourguiba, Jr., the special adviser to the president of the republic; Minister of Defense Slaheddine Baly and Mongi Kooli, the head of the party and deputy minister to the prime minister.

After saluting the flag to the sound of the national anthem played by the army band, the head of state reviewed a military detachment which paid honors to him. The president then shook hands with the members of the government who greeted him at the entrance to the Government Palace.

When leaving the Government Palace to go to the Kasbah President Bourguiba was accompanied by Allala Laouiti, the head of the Special Secretariat of the president of the republic; Abdelmajid Karoui, the director of protocol and M'heddheb Rouissi, the presiding governor of the Tunis District Council.

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TUNISIA

BRIEFS

TALKS WITH EEC--Yesterday Mohamed Ennaceur, minister of social affairs, received in his department Michel Courtier, delegate of the EEC in Tunis. In the course of the meeting the minister and his guest reviewed the state of cooperation in the field of vocational training existing between Tunisia and the EEC and, specifically, the plans for vocational training centers being implemented within the framework of such cooperation. Also discussed were prospects for the development of triangular cooperation in this sector among Tunisia, the EEC, and the African countries. [Excerpt] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 23 Jul 80 p 3] 3137

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